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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that after investing considerable time, effort, and material resources,
you have developed an innovative new product. The product's release date is
imminent, and you have laid all of the necessary groundwork. Manufacturing
is underway, distribution channels are primed, and marketing campaigns have
brought pre-release buzz to its desired peak. At this point, you receive notice
that your product contains an element that infringes intellectual property (IP)
belonging to someone else. Perhaps your product is a complex device and
only one component infringes someone else's patent. Or perhaps your product
is a film in which copyrighted artwork hangs in the background in only one
scene. In any case, the element in question is a small part of the overall
product; if you had known it to infringe earlier, you would have preferred to
design around it rather than pay anything more than a modest license fee. Now
this course is no longer an option. You have made irreversible investments,
and the value to you of the right to use the infringing element no longer
depends simply on the value that element adds to your product compared to
other means of achieving the same result. The right to use the infringing
element is now worth whatever it would cost you to pull out of the market,
rework your existing product, and prepare to release it all over again. If an
injunction is ordered forcing you to do this, you will incur severe losses-
perhaps even lose your entire investment, though most of it was spent in the
development of non-infringing elements.
Assume that an injunction will be ordered in the absence of some agreement
between you and the IP owner, with whom you now enter into negotiations.
There are two possible outcomes: (1) no agreement will be reached, and you
will be required to incur the losses of withdrawing your product, or (2) you
will reach a deal allowing you to continue with the product release, but likely
at the price of paying a large portion of your revenues to the IP owner-a
portion much larger than that of the product's value derived from use of the
infringing element. This dynamic is called "holdout," and it occurs whenever
a property owner's right to exclude gives him leverage over productive efforts
whose value cannot be realized without making some use of that property. As
the productive party, you will not like either of the two outcomes. Is there any
reason, however, why third parties observing the proceedings should
sympathize? After all, you were infringing, and the IP owner presumably
invested considerable time, effort, and material resources in developing the
protected element.
There are essentially two reasons to be concerned about the dynamic
described above. One reason is fear that the parties may fail to reach an
agreement in these cases, even in circumstances in which the infringing
product would not conflict with any development of the intellectual property
by its owner-thus resulting in wasted resources and loss of potentially large
[Vol. 59:61
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gains from trade. The other reason for concern is the belief that even if the
parties do reach an agreement, it is undesirable for the IP owner to command a
disproportionately large share of those gains where they result primarily from
2the other party's productive investments. This latter position may be
understood as a belief about the demands of equity, based on a particular
notion of distributive justice. Alternatively, it may be based on the idea that
overcompensating IP owners at the expense of people who make productive
downstream use of their works inefficiently skews investment incentives.
3
Either way, we would prefer, if possible, to see exchanges in which each party
reaps a share of gains proportional to the value that it contributed. As a
general rule, however, courts do not override a property owner's right to
exclude simply because someone else has put himself over an economic
barrel.4  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
observed more than once that "'the right to exclude ... is but the essence of
the concept of property.' 5 This proposition was long treated as self-evidently
justifying a rule that patent owners who won at trial-succeeding both in
proving infringement and withstanding challenges to the validity and
enforceability of the patent-were presumptively entitled to permanent
injunctive relief.6
This presumption is no more. Writing for a unanimous United States
Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExehange, L.L.C., Justice Clarence
Thomas rejected the notion that IP rights axiomatically call for injunctive
enforcement, stating that "the creation of a right is distinct from the provision
1. See generally Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991)
(discussing difficulties common to negotiations that often result in the failure of parties to reach
an agreement).
2. Brief for 52 Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 1785363
(arguing that such a settlement amounts to "holdup money" that is "not a legitimate part of the
value of a patent," but is instead, "a windfall to the patent owner").
3. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) ("Such royalty overcharges act as a tax on new products incorporating
the patented technology, thereby impeding rather than promoting innovation.").
4. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("[C]ourts have in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to
protect the public interest." (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted))), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
5. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d
1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); see, e.g., Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[A] patent is a form of property right, and the right to exclude recognized in a
patent is but the essence of the concept of property."); Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782,
786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of
property."').
6. MereExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338 (articulating the "general rule ... that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged").
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of remedies for violations of that right.",7 The district courts, therefore, must
exercise their "equitable discretion" in accordance with traditional principles to
decide when the interests protected by the "right to exclude" require actual
exclusion. 8 If damages alone can provide an adequate remedy or if the balance
of hardships or the public interest requires it, a patent or copyright owner's
intellectual property may amount to nothing more than a liability owed by the
infringer. Indeed, the Supreme Court's language appears to give IP owners the
burden of demonstrating why this should not be the result.
9
The eBay decision prompted serious debate as to whether, and in what
circumstances, courts should spare infringers from the holdout dilemma
outlined above by declining to grant an injunction and instead attempting to
ascertain a reasonable amount of damages.10  The Court's opinion in eBay
offers no specific guidance on this question, stating only that in applying
"traditional equitable principles," courts should avoid "broad classifications"
or "categorical rule[s]" that predetermine outcomes in a "broad swath of
7. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
8. Id at 391. Several property scholars have begun to point out that this seeming anomaly
of a "right to exclude" that is not necessarily enforced as such may simply stem from a
fundamental error that was made by the realists in focusing on exclusion as the essence of
property. In this view, the pre-realist natural and common law tradition is better read to assign
property owners "a right to determine exclusively how a thing may be used." Eric R. Claeys,
Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 617, 631 (2009); see
also Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 275
(2008) (arguing that the "central concern" of the structure of property ownership "is not the
exclusion of all non-owners from the owned thing but, rather, the preservation of the owner's
position as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing"); Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and
Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 323 (2009) (criticizing the "exclusion
concept of patents" in patent law). As will be discussed infra at notes 69-83 and accompanying
text, the work of Henry Smith can be read as partially reconciling these two lines of thought,
justifying the enforcement of a "right to exclude" in economic terms as the most efficient means
of allocating the right to determine use.
9. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-93 ("[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.").
10. See, e.g, Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2035-44 (proposing a model for patent
reform that withholds injunctive relief under some circumstances); see also Vincenzo Denicol6 et
al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief- Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing
Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 590-91 (2008) (arguing that courts should
not withhold injunctive relief where manufacturer failed to exhibit due diligence in searching for
IP rights or where redesign was impossible ex ante); John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent
Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2111, 2147-48 (2007) (critiquing as overly broad
Lemley and Shapiro's model predicting "overcompensation" of patent owners resulting from the
presumptive availability of injunctive relief); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should
Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REv 783, 784-85 (2007) ("[T]here
are a number of cases arising under patent law that should not qualify for injunctive relief,
including possibly the eBay case itself .... ").
[Vol. 59:61
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cases."1 1 In short, the only rule announced in eBay was that in the realm of
patent injunctions, courts should not follow rules. 1 2
The potential for holdout is not unique to patent and copyright law: it
pervades property law and is treated differently in each context.13 This
differing treatment makes it difficult to address the question of IP holdout
simply by invoking the "concept of property"'14 or the analogy to tangible
possessions. Proponents for applying a strong presumption in favor of
enjoining infringement tend to analogize the problem of holdout to trespass or
encroachment, situations in which injunctive relief is the general-though still
not indefeasible-rule. 15 In other situations, such as accession or nuisance, it
has long been understood that deciding whether to grant an injunction is more
difficult than asking whether a right to exclude has been infringed., 6 If we are
to draw the correct analogies between tangible property and intellectual
property, we must first understand the reasons behind these different responses
to holdout.
The potential for holdout arises when one party makes irreversible
investments without first securing the right to use a unique resource needed to
realize the value of those investments. An obvious objection to allowing these
parties to escape injunction is that doing so would encourage more people to
exercise the same carelessness, reducing their incentive to secure needed rights
in advance and increasing the number of cases in which courts are called upon
to override an owner's right to exclude. The force of this objection in any
given context depends in part on the extent to which such ex ante avoidance is
both feasible and desirable. To successfully avoid the risk of holdout ex ante,
17
the investing party must correctly answer two questions prior to making
significant irreversible investments. First, she must correctly identify all
unique resources that are owned and that are potentially implicated by the
contemplated project. Second, she must determine whether the contemplated
project would, if not licensed, actually infringe the property rights of the
resource owners. Only after answering these questions is the investor in a
11. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
12. See id. (declining to adopt a categorical rule premised on a four-factor test).
13. See infra Part II (discussing the inefficiency and distributive injustice of holdout power
in the context of property).
14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part V.B (examining infringement in comparison to trespass and encroachment
in comparison to nuisance); see also Archer v. Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 233 U.S. 60, 64-65
(1914) (granting injunction as relief for trespass); Urban Site Venture II L.P. v. Levering Assocs.,
665 A.2d 1062 (Md. 1995) (granting injunction as relief for encroachment); 9 RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.09 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009) (discussing
injunctions as proper equitable relief for a finding of encroachment).
16. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, V.B.
17. By "ex ante," I mean efforts that occur prior to making the irreversible investments that
render one susceptible to holdout.
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position to choose between negotiating for the rights to use the resource,
designing around it, or foregoing the investment altogether. We can describe
the costs incurred in discovering and acting on this information as "avoidance
costs"-that is, the costs of avoiding a situation in which one's productive
investments are vulnerable to holdout. The more difficult and costly it is to
answer correctly the two questions before committing significant resources to a
project, the greater the obstacles are to ex ante avoidance of holdout.
The primary thesis of this Article is that our willingness to rescue investors
from holdout by relaxing property rules in a given context depends largely on
the nature of these avoidance costs and that these costs are likely to be
particularly acute in the realm of intellectual property. In particular, where the
process of productive investment itself generates information that is necessary
or useful to identify property rights that an enterprise will need to acquire,
there is far less to be gained by holding investors to a high standard of ex ante
avoidance.
Part II discusses the nature of the holdout problem and the difficulty of
distinguishing strategic holdouts from refusals to sell based on bona fide
idiosyncratic or entrepreneurial value. Part III reconstructs the problems of
undercompensation and information costs that have been identified by Richard
Epstein and Henry Smith as strong reasons to adhere to property rules in most
transactions between private parties, despite the occasional risk of holdout.
18
The advantage of property rules (in Smith's terms, "exclusion strateg[ies]"' 19) is
that they reduce information costs by using simple physical boundaries as
20proxies for the open-ended and undefined set of potential uses of a resource.
Shifting to a system of liability rules (in Smith's terms, "governance
strateg[ies]"), increases information costs, because both public and private
actors are required to make fine distinctions between uses in order to
recognize, comply with, and enforce property rights. 21 Further, systematic
opportunities are created for undercompensation of property owners due to the
inevitable gap between their knowledge of the entrepreneurial value of a given
resource and the knowledge embodied in the criteria used to determine value
for liability purposes. Using this analysis as a baseline, Parts IV and V
examine the spectrum of property cases to observe the role played by
18. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2092-96 (1997) [hereinafter Epstein, A Clear View]; Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719, 1731 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property
Rules].
19. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1728.
20. The terms "property rule" and "liability rule" stem from Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 (1972).
21. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1728.
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avoidance costs in determining when strict enforcement of the right to exclude
is relaxed.
At one end of the conflicting use spectrum are possessory uses of tangible
resources. Courts generally grant injunctive relief for trespass and
encroachment, thus giving landowners full title to any unauthorized
improvements made to their property. 22 This is logical because one's need to
make possessory use of land is usually easy to identify in advance, and there is
little ambiguity as to whether such uses will require a negotiation of property
rights. The accession doctrine, however, provides a narrow exception that
allows certain good-faith improvers to retain the value they have created while
23paying restitution for that of what they took. Such takings are rare because
they are only allowed where the improver had an objectively reasonable basis
for believing that she had the right to use the property and, acting in reliance
on it, transformed it into something vastly more valuable. 24 Although this
form of the accession doctrine is rarely applied, it illustrates the principle that
equity will relax the strict right to exclude where this can be done without
inviting o portunism and where enforcing it would lead to clear distributional
inequity.
The next point on the conflicting use spectrum is the instance of rival, non-
possessory uses of land-that is, nuisances. The law of nuisance is notoriously
convoluted, but it is several steps removed from strict enforcement of the right
to exclude. Before a court will consider enjoining a spillover effect as a
nuisance, the activity must meet the threshold requirement of significant
harm.26 Even where this standard is met, however, the nuisance will generally
only be enjoined after the court weighs multiple factors, including the value of
the nuisance-creating activity relative to that of the damage it causes.
27
Although cases may vary, perfect ex ante avoidance is likely to be extremely
difficult where spillover effects are involved. This is because one can rarely
predict with perfect accuracy the exact incidence and severity of such effects or
the relative economic values of the offending activity and the conflicting uses
that may be damaged. For some types of productive activity, actual
experimentation (thus leading to the kinds of investments that render one
vulnerable to holdout) may be the only way to find out what use rights the
22. See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part IV.B.
24. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 312-16 (1871) (finding that good-faith
improvers who make vast improvements to a chattel may retain title).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part V.A (articulating the "significant-harm rule").
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822-831 (1977) (outlining the various
factors needed to determine an injunction for nuisance); see also Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur,
Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 667 (Tenn. 1904) (refusing to grant an injunction because of
various factors, including the value of the activity creating the nuisance).
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enterprise actually requires to function and whether it is valuable enough to
make the purchase of those rights worthwhile. Tellingly, even a strong
proponent of property rules-such as Epstein-maintains that in nuisance
cases, courts should decline to issue injunctions where there is a great disparity
of demonstrated value between the offending activity and the activity that is
damaged. 28 This rule of thumb permits the acquisition of non-possessory use
privileges by accession.
Part VI addresses the realm of intellectual property. Smith argues that the
same analysis of information costs favoring an exclusion strategy for tangible
property also applies to intellectual property because of the benefits of
modularity that arise from bundling all use rights of a given intellectual work
within the same party's right to exclude. This conclusion follows only to the
extent that the reified abstraction of an intellectual work is believed to have
boundaries that are as easy to identify and avoid interference with as the
boundaries of physical objects. 30 This Article asserts that this is far from the
case. The "boundaries" of an intellectual work consist of nothing but an
abstract description of potential fine-grained uses of tangible property. IP
rights thus amount to negative easements in gross that appropriate specific use
privileges that tangible property owners would otherwise control with respect
to their own property.31 In Smith's terms, to create IP rights governed by an
"exclusion strategy" is inevitably to create a governance regime in tangible
property. 32  Indeed, the manner in which patent rights are acquired can be
analogized to a liability proceeding in which would-be takers offer information
to tangible property owners as the price for a compulsory expropriation of use
privileges. The same dynamic of systematic undercompensation that Smith
depicts in his analysis of governance regimes is applicable here, in that some
property owners will inevitably receive information that is worth less to them
28. See Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2102.
29. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1748-49 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property]
(discussing the ability of property rules to reduce information costs by promoting modularity, and
arguing that this renders exclusion strategies equally advantageous for intellectual and tangible
property).
30. See id. at 1795 (asserting that the costs of solidifying an idea protected by IP principles
are not "fundamentally different" than the costs of constructing tangible property).
31. See generally United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 445-46 (Va. 2005) (defining
negative easements as those that "convey rights to demand that the owner of the servient tract
refrain from certain otherwise permissible uses of his own land" and easements in gross as those
benefitting individual persons as opposed to those running with tracts of land (citations omitted)).
32. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1728.
33. Parallel arguments can be made with respect to copyright law, but there are significant
differences between patent law and copyright law that require separate discussion. This Article
constructs a general argument and applies it to patent law, leaving the discussion of copyright law
for a future project.
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than the use privileges lost.34
Although the ex ante avoidance costs associated with patent law are high
enough to justify application of the accession rule, there is a serious obstacle to
doing so. The accession doctrine requires a comparison of the value added by
the taker to that of the original resource. 35 The value of a patent---or, to be
more precise, of specific use privileges to technology covered by one or more
of that patent's claims-will often be difficult to determine because of the lack
of a robust market. Patent owners also face higher information costs than
landowners, because it is far more difficult for them to detect and forestall
infringement than it is for a landowner to take action against a nuisance before
its economic value becomes too far entrenched. If patent owners are to have
any ability to protect and develop the entrepreneurial value of their IP
resources against rival uses, the accession rule must not be applied to patent
rights that have been licensed only exclusively or not at all.
By choosing to license a protected use nonexclusively, an IP owner creates a
market for that use and signals that there is no entrepreneurial value to be
protected through exclusivity. In other words, the actions of third-party
improvers in commercializing the licensed use do not rival the IP owner's
strategy of earning returns; in fact, so long as the improvers become licensees
and pay for use rights, they are that strategy. The primary justification for the
right to exclude-protection of one rival use from another-thus does not
apply. This is not a reason to stop providing property-rule protection
altogether, however; an assumed right to exclude is the only basis on which the
market can perform its function of assigning appropriate exchange value to the
use rights in question. If, on the other hand, it is apparent in a given case that
the market value of the protected use on its own is low compared to the value
of the investments that would be destroyed by an injunction, it is justifiable to
decline to issue an injunction and rely instead on punitive damages to protect
the integrity of the market price by creating continued incentives for ex ante
avoidance to the extent feasible.
II. THE PROBLEM OF HOLDOUT
As a general matter, holdout power is said to arise when B needs a unique
resource owned by A, "such that each can deal only with the other for the
useful exchange to take place. 36 Why exactly is this a problem? Assume that
B values the resource more than A; why would B not be expected simply to
purchase it from A in a mutually beneficial exchange? Or if A refuses to sell to
34. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 320 (1871) (mandating that a comparison
in value be considered in deciding cases of accession).
35. See generally Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1764-68 (discussing governance
and exclusion regimes).
36. See Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2094.
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B, why is it not simply concluded that A in fact values the resource more than
B does, meaning that the goal of economic efficiency-that is, the dedication
of resources to their highest-valued uses-is furthered by the refusal? Given
that there are only two readily identifiable parties to the transaction, it seems at
first blush that transaction costs should be as low as possible, making it unclear
why these situations should be regarded as posing any extraordinary risk of
market failure.
The refusals to sell that tend to be labeled "holdouts" are those in which it is
believed that B in fact values the resource more than A, and A's refusal to sell
is merely "strategic." A basic hypothetical example would be the owner of the
final parcel of land needed to complete a railroad. Without the railroad project,
the market value of the land would depend on its other known uses, such as the
value of the crops that could be cultivated or the value of any improvements
that were present or contemplated. Critically, however, once the land becomes
necessary to the completion of the railroad, the value of the right to exclude
others from the land becomes equal to the value of the completed railroad. All
of the investments made while constructing the railroad up to this point-as
well as all the investors' hopes of future profits-are entirely contingent on the
landowner's willingness to sell, thus enabling the landowner to "hold out" for
as large a sum as he thinks the investors are able and desperate enough to pay.
Even at this point, we might still ask, "So what? Don't all sellers attempt to
feel out buyers (at least to the extent possible) in order to obtain the highest
price from the deal?" Why does this dynamic seem particularly troublesome in
the cases characterized as "holdouts"?
As noted above, there are two different types of concerns that have been
expressed about holdout situations.37 The first concern-based on economic
efficiency-is that holdout power may prevent the realization of potentially
large social gains from trade. The second concern-based on distributive
justice-is that even if an efficient transaction takes place, something about the
resulting terms of exchange is socially undesirable.
A. Holdout as Failure of Efficiency
Why are holdout scenarios thought to be particularly conducive to market
failure? The explanation usually given is that these situations involve a large
gap between the values assigned to the resource by each of the two parties. As
Richard Epstein explains, if A values the resource at 10 and B values it at 1000,
then any sale price between 11 and 999 would be "mutually beneficial. 38
Given that no such price can be determined in the abstract, however, each side
has a "strong incentive[] to hold out for the largest fraction of the gain."3 9 This
37. See text accompanying notes 1-3.
38. See Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2094.
39. Id.
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gives rise to two possible scenarios in which the potential social gains from
trade fail to materialize. In one scenario, the hardball tactics employed by both
sides cause negotiations to break down such that there are no gains whatsoever.
In the other scenario, the parties strike a deal, but the costs of narrowing the
wide range of potentially acceptable prices to the price ultimately agreed on are
so large that they dissipate some or all of the social surplus. 4° If there is more
than one property owner in the position of A, then there is another reason why
a deal may not be struck: each of the owners must be able and willing to
bargain collectively with B over division of the gains from trade; otherwise no
concession on B's part made to any individual owner will guarantee B's ability
to realize the surplus.
This manner of describing the holdout scenario glosses over an important-
though seemingly elementary-point: what exactly is meant when it is said
that A "values" the resource at 10? In the context of this negotiation, A clearly
values the resource at far more than 10; otherwise A would not be so tenacious
in demanding a much higher price. Economic analysis is premised on the
assumption that value is subjective and can be measured empirically only in
relative terms and only through the preferences revealed by choices that people
make in action.41 For example, if A is offered ten dollars for his land and
refuses, then by definition he values that land at more than ten dollars. Indeed,
assuming that A is not under duress, the statement, "he values the land more
than X," means nothing more than the statement, "he would refuse to sell it for
a price of X." Why, then, do economists persist in describing the holdout
scenario as one in which A refuses to sell for 10 even though "in actuality" he
only values it at 10?42 In attempting to answer this question, it is worth
pausing to consider that there are at least three very different types of scenarios
that might be labeled as apparent instances of "holdout."
In the first scenario-"idiosyncratic holdout"-A places a genuine
subjective value greater than 10 on his present use of the resource, but does so
for reasons to which no market can assign value. For example, a person
40. Id. In Epstein's example, the potential social surplus from trade is "equal to 1000 minus
10, or 990." Id. If the parties ultimately agree on a price of 400, A realizes a gain of 390, and B
realizes a gain of 600. If, however, A and B spent 300 and 400 respectively in order to reach this
agreement, the total surplus has been reduced to 290.
41. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10
(1983) (referring to this assumption as the "assumption of consumer sovereignty"); LUDWIG VON
MISES, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS 178 (George Reisman trans., Ludwig von
Mises Inst. 3d ed. 2003) (1933) ("[T]he ultimate relevant cause of the exchange ratios of the
market is the fact that the individual, in the act of exchange, prefers a definite quantity of good A
to a definite quantity of good B. The reasons he may have for acting exactly thus and not
otherwise ... are of absolutely no importance for the determination of a market price.")
42. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1106-07 (discussing holdout in terms
of a divergence between "the price demanded" and "the value which the sellers in actuality
attach").
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engages in idiosyncratic holdout when he refuses to sell his home at market
value because of his sentimental attachment to it. Because the satisfaction A
gets from continuing to live in this home cannot be transferred to anyone else,
it cannot be valued in any market. Nevertheless, A's refusal to sell is not
strategic-he is merely demanding an amount that truly compensates him for
the value relinquished. Because the basis for A's demand cannot be readily
evaluated by others, third parties may regard A as simply resisting the
consummation of an efficient exchange. If we assume A to be truthful about
his reasons for refusing to sell, the subjective theory of value gives us no basis
on which to second-guess his valuation of the utility that he gains from the
resource. We can say only that A's use has a higher value than that of any
offer he refuses, and therefore, from an efficiency standpoint, all is right with
the world.
The second type of apparent holdout--"entrepreneurial holdout"--occurs
when A believes, for reasons unknown to others, that in the future it will be
possible to put the resource to a use worth more than its present value of 10.
Here too, A's refusal to sell for 10 is not merely a stratagem to extract a higher
price from B-in principle, A would be willing to sell for any price that
exceeds his assessment of the resource's future value, discounted over the
period of time that he believes it will take to realize that value. A may be
presently unable, however, to demonstrate persuasively the basis for his
assessment of the resource's future value. Or A may wish to keep the
information to himself in order to place himself in a position to maximize his
profits when the time is right. Either way, to third parties it may once again
appear that A is simply impeding the realization of an immediate social gain,
but-from an economic perspective-it cannot be denied that A in fact values
the resource at more than 10. There may be room for disagreement about the
accuracy of A's valuation, however, because it is not based on a purely
subjective assessment of utilit, but rather on an estimation of future uses and
their uncertain market values.43 In this case, whether we regard A's refusal to
sell as efficient depends on whether we believe that he is likely to have a more
accurate assessment of the resource's future value than B.
The third type of holdout-"strategic holdout"-is the type Epstein regards
as a source of market failure.44 Here, A does not derive any value greater than
10 from his present use of the resource. Moreover, A has no reason to believe
that he-or anyone other than B-will ever be able to use the resource in a
manner that yields a value greater than 10. Rather, it is only A's knowledge
that B, and B alone, stands in a position to put the resource to a higher-value
43. It may also be based or. A's assessment of the subjective utility he will gain from future
uses of the resource, in which case the scenario is just another variety of idiosyncratic holdout.
44. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing Epstein's model of a type of
holdout power that gives rise to strategic bargaining and is often considered conducive to market
failure).
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use-and that B needs this specific resource in order to realize that value-that
causes A to perceive the resource as having an exchange value greater than 10.
There is nothing surprising about this reaction on A's part; any rational actor
values a resource not merely based on what he can do with it, but rather, on
what he believes he can get for it.45 Indeed, much important economic activity
consists of acquiring resources for the sole purpose of selling them to others
who are better positioned to use them. It is thus misleading to insist-as is
done when discussing strategic holdout-that A only values the resource at 10.
It would be more accurate to say that A only values his ability to use the
resource at 10, but that he values his ability to exclude B from using the
resource at more than 10.
The tendency to refer to A's use value as A's "actual" value reflects the
perspective of the economist whose goal is overall efficiency and who
observes that as long as the resource remains in A's possession it will be
dedicated to uses valued at no more than 10. In other words, it is not really A
who values the resource at 10, it is the economist who only values A's
continued possession at 10.
B. Holdout as Distributive Injustice
Assume now that A has both the knowledge and the wherewithal to
strategically hold out in a transaction with B. Assume also that A is savvy
enough to achieve this without either torpedoing the exchange or allowing an
exorbitant portion of the gains from trade to be dissipated in negotiation. As a
result, the efficient transfer occurs, and A is able to extract the lion's share of
46the surplus in the sale price of the resource. Is there any reason this result
should be considered unjust? In a trenchant essay on the debate over property
rules versus liability rules, James Krier and Stewart Schwab assert that there is
no reason to consider the result unjust because the surplus "simply represents
the gains from trade, to which neither party is, prima facie, entitled.' 47 This
assertion is true as long as the inquiry remains within the realm of Coasean
efficiency analysis, but verdant though that valley is, few reside there without
dual citizenship elsewhere.
48
45. In other words, in a market economy selling something is one of the most important
things you can do with a resource.
46. For example, suppose the highest valued use to which A can put the resource is worth
10, while B's investment would give the resource a value of 1000. Reallocating the resource to B
would thus result in a social surplus of 990. IfA manages to negotiate a selling price of 800, and
each party incurs 50 in transaction costs, we are left with a social surplus of 890, of which 750 is
going to A and 140 is going to B.
47. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral
in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 466 (1995) (criticizing the belief that liability rules are
better than property rules in situations of high transaction costs).
48. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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It is surely desirable to maximize the total value we extract from the
resources at society's disposal, and economics derives its normative force from
claiming to demonstrate objectively that certain arrangements will further or
impede this goal more than others. On the other hand, few would maintain that
as long as social value is maximized, we have no reason to care how
enjoyment of that value is distributed among the members of society. There
are many possible criteria one might use to decide whether a particular
distribution of wealth is just.49  Each such criterion would need its own
philosophical justification, and each would in turn give rise to a different
framework for deciding when justice requires that the set of efficiency-
maximizing rules be modified or departed from. The argument developed in
this Article will consider only one such criterion of distributive justice: that
requiring newly created value to be allocated among persons in proportion to
the relative contributions those persons made to the generation of that value,
through inputs such as initiative, effort, skill, investment (including
contributions of both tangible property and labor), and risk-bearing. A
rigorous philosophical justification of this criterion is beyond the scope of this
Article, and no claim is made here as to its relative importance or validity
compared to other possible criteria of distributive justice. The notion that
investment of productive inputs should give one a claim on any resulting
value-in addition to being intuitively appealing and deeply embedded in our
society--has long been one of the key justifications both for recognizing IP
rights in the first place and for tending to protect them by a strict right to
51
exclude. Owners of IP rights often feel strongly that it is just for them to
49. See, e.g., Posting of Lawrence Solum to Legal Theory Lexicon, http://Isolum.typepad.
com/legal theory_lexicon/2005/07/legal theoryle.html (July 10, 2005).
50. The classic source is, of course, Locke's justification of private property on the ground
that ownership arises when someone "hath mixed his [1labour with, and joyned to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his [p]roperty. It being by him removed from the common
state [n]ature placed it in, it hath by this [liabour something annexed to it, that exludes the
common right of other [m]en." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). It ought to, but unfortunately does not, go
without saying that when Locke says "labour" in this context he means productive labor-that is,
labor that actually renders the common property more capable of satisfying human wants than it
was before. See Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 158-
61 (2002) (responding to various philosophers who have dismissed Lockean property theory as
incoherent or absurd based on their own incoherent or absurd notions as to what qualifies as
"labor").
51. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 277-78 (1992) (discussing a trend in intellectual
property law to treat all appropriations of value created by another as actionable). Gordon notes
that
judges may feel no need to examine the trend because the restitutionary notion that one
deserves to keep the "fruits of his labor" seems so evidently correct, so evidently in
accord with traditional notions of corrective justice and traditional conceptions of the
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command holdout premiums, precisely because those rights-they assert-
represent value that is entirely the result of their productive efforts. However,
this claim is a two-edged sword: once the value at issue seems to owe more to
the improver's efforts than the owner's property, justice may seem to favor
overriding the owner's absolute right to exclude in favor of a damages award
that gives each contributor his due.
It is important to distinguish between a criterion of distributive justice,
holding that gains from trade should be divided in proportion to productive
input, and a labor theory of value, holding that the value of any resource is
determined by the amount of effort contributed to its production. Since the
marginal revolution in economic theory, mainstream economists have rejected
the labor theory-instead viewing the value of a resource as determined by its
marginal utility and relative scarcity. 52 A resource has utility to the extent that
it satisfies subjective human wants, and it may do so (or fail to do so)
regardless of the amount of labor that went into its creation. Given that both
the content of human wants and the scarcity of any given resource can change
at any time for an indefinite number of reasons that may or may not be
attributable to deliberate human action, some doubt should exist as to whether,
under the subjective theory, any human action produces value. At the very
least, any judgment that it does will raise difficulties similar to those
encountered in applying the legal concept of "proximate cause."
We need not overstate the problem, however: notwithstanding constant
change, there is still enough continuity in our constellations of wants and
resources that successful productive effort is possible. Although the value of a
given resource will never be entirely attributable to human effort, it will often
be possible to identify with tolerable certainty human actions that have
contributed to a resource's present ability to satisfy particular wants.
53
Moreover, distributive justice requires only that such judgments be made in
rough comparative terms sufficient to decide whether one claimant has a
significantly stronger case than the other.
judicial role, that giving legal protection to intellectual products appears to require no
special justification.
Id.
52. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic
Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 818 (1989) ("A clean answer to the 'paradox of
value' is that, while water is more useful and its total utility exceeds diamonds', the relative
scarcity of diamonds makes their marginal utility exceed water's.").
53. Any complete theory of distributive justice along these lines must decide whether and
how to distinguish between actions that produce value intentionally (that is, where the increased
ability to satisfy human wants is of the type and magnitude that the actor intended to achieve) and
actions that do so unintentionally (that is, where unforeseen circumstances render the results of
one's efforts valuable in a way-or to a degree-that one did not intend).
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III. THE ADVANTAGES OF PROPERTY RULES
This Article has described two reasons why holdout scenarios might be
regarded as problematic. The first is an efficiency concern-that holdout
scenarios are likely either to thwart the transfer of resources to higher-value
uses or to consume a large part of the resulting social surplus in transaction
costs.54  The second is a distributive justice concem-that even when the
efficient result is achieved, holdout scenarios result in a disproportionate share
of the gains from trade being reaped by parties who are comparatively
55undeserving in terms of their productive contributions. Given these reasons,
the next question is why we nevertheless tend to allow resource owners to
wield holdout power, with intervention to prevent this being the rare exception
rather than the rule. Or, to use the standard jargon popularized by Calabresi
and Melamed: why is property protected by "property rules"? 56
A. Reasons for Not Attempting to Correct Holdout Inefficiency
A central objection to the use of liability rules is that they lead to
undercompensation of resource owners-an effect that has been dubbed
"Epstein's Law." 57 Epstein's Law rests on two reasons why compensation will
systematically fall short under liability rules. The first reason is that there are
costs to expropriated resource owners that the compensation mechanism
cannot address even in principle, because takings damages necessarily ignore
all elements of subjective loss. 58  For example, when the fair value of
someone's house is being determined, only those aspects of the house capable
of being valued in a market can be considered. No attempt is made to
compensate the owner for the value of subjective factors, such as the owner's
sentimental attachment to the home, his social investment in the neighborhood,
54. See supra Part II.A.
55. See supra Part II.B.
56. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1105-10. In Calabresi and Melamed's
terminology, an entitlement protected by injunction is subject to a "property rule," which means
that taking it without the owner's consent subjects one to severe sanctions designed to be
prohibitive. Id. at 1106. When an entitlement is protected by a "liability rule" on the other hand,
taking it without the owner's consent only renders one liable to pay damages to the owner in an
amount determined by reference to some collectively determined criteria. Id. at 1107.
57. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 10, at 788.
Specifically, the objection is not just that courts will not identify damages accurately
but that the deviation will be systematic in one direction. As Richard Epstein puts it,
the argument is that "[t]he risk of undercompensation in such situations is pervasive,"
thereby undermining investment incentives. As a shorthand, we call this "Epstein's
Law."
Id. at 787-88 (quoting Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2093).
58. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1125 ("Liability rules represent only an
approximation of the value of the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such an
approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the thief than to the owner.").
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his knowledge of the home's available resources, or his comfort in familiar
habits of everyday life. Such intangibles can be given economic weight only
when they are protected by the right to engage in idiosyncratic holdout-that
is, the right to exclude.59
Subjective loss in value is not the only element to elude compensation.
Consequential damages, such as the disruption that occurs on the loss of an
asset needed to operate one's business, also go uncompensated in a liability
regime.6 ° As Epstein points out, commercial relations also rely heavily on the
expectation that goods promised will actually be tendered, and substituting
expectation damages is not satisfactory. 61 This is because "[t]he damages are
insufficient to cover the dislocations brought on by the exceptions and create
further ripple effects by destabilizing relations that the innocent and
disappointed buyer might have with his own customers." In a broad sense
then, the threat of non-consensual takings undermines security of possession
and security of exchange, both of which are needed to maintain a complex
63
social order and to conduct a satisfactory personal life. All of these concerns
fall under the rubric of use value-that is, they pertain to the utility that owners
derive from being able to rely on specific physical resources without
interference.
The second reason underlying Epstein's Law is that even where efforts are
made to compensate for those elements of use value that should in principle be
susceptible to objective appraisal, there will nevertheless be systematic bias• 64 "
toward undervaluation. Although the "law" has been named after Epstein,the most thorough explanation of this dynamic is offered by Henry Smith.65
59. See supra pp. 71-72 (describing a holdout scenario in which the property seller values
his property higher than market value to account for subjective factors).
60. See Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2093. It is not actually impossible, in
principle, for a takings system to attempt to provide compensation for consequential damages the
same way a tort system does; however, such is not the normal practice. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 51-56, 80-86
(1985) (exploring theories of providing compensation for consequential damages and takings of
goodwill).
61. See Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2099 (observing that the common contracts
principle known as the "perfect-tender rule" is premised on the notion that a merchant is expected
to deliver goods, not the value of those goods in expectation damages).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 2093 ("Over time, the inefficiencies of a liability system cascade until the
security of possession and the security of exchange needed for complex commercial life and a
satisfying personal one are no longer available.").
64. See id.; Lemley & Weiser, supra note 10, at 788 ("Epstein's Law holds that would-be
purchasers of a property right invariably prefer liability rules and use them as an opportunity for
government rent-seeking.").
65. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1764-68 (examining the "[m]anipulation
and the [d]eterioration of [1]iability [s]ignals").
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Smith's analysis of property and liability rules focuses on the costs of
producing information about resources and activities.66 Any resource can be
seen as a collection of potentially valuable uses, some of which will interfere
with others. To achieve allocative efficiency, we must produce, communicate,
and act on information about the costs and benefits of actual and potential uses
of resources. 6 7 This gives rise to multiple categories of costs-for example,
the cost of investigating resources and their potential uses (assessment costs);
the cost of deciding which use-or set of uses-has the highest value
(allocation costs); the cost of implementing allocative decisions by creating
and maintaining a set of rules that govern day-to-day use of the resource
(rulemaking costs); the cost of communicating these rules to those who need to
know them (promulgation costs); the cost to those who need to know the rules
of informing themselves about and complying with the rules (compliance
costs); and the costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance (monitoring and
enforcement costs). All of these costs must be incorporated into our overall
evaluation of the relative efficiency of property rules versus liability rules.
Smith focuses on the consequences for these categories of costs when
individual owners-as opposed to public officials-make decisions about
resource allocation.
68
Smith describes two broad strategies for making use decisions about
resources: the "exclusion strategy" and the "governance strategy.' 69  An
exclusion strategy delegates to private-property owners all decisions
concerning assessment, allocation, and rulemaking. In order to effect this
delegation, the exclusion regime employs simple boundaries that serve as a
rough proxy signal for the open-ended and undefined set of potential uses of
the resource. 71 Anyone who transgresses these boundaries without the owner's
consent is subject to sanctions without any need for officials to identify or
evaluate the specific use being made by the transgressor. 72  A governance
strategy, on the other hand, employs some form of collective decision-making
to select and evaluate resource uses, dealing directly with some or all of the
issues that are left for owners to handle under exclusion. 73 To the extent that
the law moves in the direction of a govemance regime, some official body
must set rules governing these matters so that the functions of assessment,
allocation, and rulemaking can be performed collectively rather than privately.
As a result, these functions will need to be performed and justified publicly in
66. Id. at 1753-54.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1755.
69. Id. at 1755-56.
70. Id. at 1755.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1755-56.
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accordance with legal procedures, which is already a reason why one would
expect the associated costs to be higher than they would be in an exclusion
regime.
In addition to being costly, the public nature of decision-making in a
governance regime gives rise to the likelihood of undercompensation for
owners when resource uses are allocated to other parties (takers). This occurs
because there will always be a gap between the best known uses of a resource
and the best publicly verifiable uses of that resource-a gap that can (and will)
be taken advantage of by takers. Two interrelated reasons cause this gap. The
first reason stems from the nature of the entrepreneurial function, which
consists of making decisions about resource use in response to various degrees
of uncertainty. 74 Entrepreneurial owners develop information that is needed to
turn uncertainty into risk and make bets on such information before it can be
75
credibly communicated to others. Under a governance regime, an
opportunistic taker need only invest enough resources in gathering
information--or in free-riding on information generated by the present
owner-to determine that a resource is worth more than its objectively
verifiable value, at which point the taker is in a position to profit by taking
property and undercompensating the owner. An owner engaged in what was
earlier described as entrepreneurial holdout has decided that the best time to
assign a publicly shared valuation to the resource is sometime in the future.
7 6
Under an exclusion regime, both the benefits of getting this right and the costs
of error are internalized, giving the owner proper incentives to invest in the
77development of information about the resource's best uses. Under a
governance regime, an opportunistic taker can force officials to undertake
public valuation of a resource in the present, even though the best time to do so
may be in the future.
78
The second reason for the gap between the best known uses and those that
are publically verifiable is the inherent imperfection of proxy signals
necessarily used to determine use values in a governance system. To make
publicly verifiable determinations of value, officials must establish objective
criteria to guide the value determination. Thus, in a governance regime, the
74. By uncertainty, we do not simply mean risk; rather, we mean risk that cannot be
expressed as an actuarial probability. As Smith observes, entrepreneurs profit from the
opportunities afforded by uncertainty; if everyone shared identical information about risk,
entrepreneurial profit would vanish. Id. at 1725; see also LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION:
A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 293 (Henry Regnery Co. 3d rev. ed. 1966) (1949) ("If all
entrepreneurs were to anticipate correctly the future state of the market, there would be neither
profits nor losses.").
75. Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1725.
76. Id. at 1763-64.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1763.
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allocation function itself involves internal costs of rulemaking, promulgation,
compliance, and enforcement (that is, those costs associated with either
eminent domain hearings or lawsuits for damages), in addition to those costs
that will be incurred to effectuate the allocation after it has been chosen. Once
these evaluative criteria are set, they function like the price for fruit in a large
bin, allowing takers to incur information costs to identify subsets whose
members have an average value higher than the one determined by the
officials.79 To use an example cited by Smith, if redness is the signal used to
determine the quality of apples, then takers will learn to identify those apples
that are underpriced because they actually taste better than their color would
indicate. 80 Meanwhile, apple sellers will invest in techniques to make apples
appear redder without actually improving their taste, thus causing the
correlation between color and flavor quality to deteriorate over time.' A
governance regime will be forced to invest constantly in reevaluating and
recalibrating its criteria for determining use values if it intends to stay ahead of
manipulation and deterioration. In other words, rulemaking costs will be
ongoing-and substantial-because of the public nature of the deliberations
involved.
In an exclusion regime, the tasks of assessment, allocation, and rulemaking
for resource use are delegated to private owners, and all public officials must
do is protect that delegation. This, too, requires rulemaking and
promulgation-but of a much simpler variety than that directed at daily
governance of uses-because it focuses on rough, low-cost signals that serve
indirectly to protect the large and unspecified set of uses delegated to the82
owner. A prime example of this is the boundary around a parcel of land. To
determine whether the owner's use rights are being violated, an official need
only focus on the physical location of actors and objects with respect to the
boundary, not their activities with respect to the resource or the value of those
activities. These signals marking physical location are far less vulnerable to
manipulation and deterioration, and thus the costs of public rulemaking are far
lower than those incurred when rulemaking involves the direct identification
and pricing of specific uses.
83
Another consequence of the undercompensation and opportunism endemic
to governance regimes is an increase in the costs associated with self-help.
These costs exist even in exclusion regimes because the public mechanisms for
protecting and enforcing property rights are far from perfect. Thus, even
individuals who have theoretically absolute legal rights to exclude others from
79. Id at 1764.
80. Id
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1765.
83. Id. at 1745-46.
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their property will invest in fences, guards, anti-theft devices, and other means
to thwart takings by people undeterred by theoretical absolutes. In a
governance regime, these costs are augmented, because owners are moved to
protect not only against illegal appropriation of the resources in their control,
but also against appropriations that are legal, but for which they know the
liability rules will undercompensate them. Would-be takers, in turn, are
motivated to invest in ways to circumvent the owners' self-help measures.
1. Compliance, Monitoring, and Enforcement Costs
In addition to the problem of undercompensation and the heightened costs of
allocation and rulemaking, governance regimes face heightened costs of
promulgation, compliance, monitoring, and enforcement. As has already been
seen, exclusion regimes rely on crude boundaries, such as the contours of
physical objects, to protect an undefined and open-ended set of potential
uses. 84 This results in relatively low compliance costs because it is relatively
easy for third parties to know when they are at risk of interfering with owners'
property rights. For example, when X sees an unfamiliar car parked
somewhere, he automatically knows that he is excluded from using it in any
way. It is not necessary to know who the owner is or to weigh the specific use
that X might have made of the car against any valuation standard. Such ease of
notice is important, because property rights are rights in rem-that is, they can
be enforced against the rest of the world in perpetuity, without reference to any
relationships between particular persons.85  This means that a wide and
indefinite group of people must incur information costs in order to comply
with these rights. For this reason, property rights are usually subject to
mandatory limitations, such as the numerus clausus doctrine, which limits
these rights to a menu of standardized forms that articulate the types of
property rights and the ways in which they can be subdivided. 86 Under a
governance regime, determining whether or not X can use any given parked car
(including his own) at any given time for any given purpose could require him
to research the applicable use rules promulgated by officials and to discern
whether designated circumstances exist under which use is permitted. As the
number of defined use rights increases, so do the compliance costs for those
who must take them into account when acting. The same is true for
monitoring and enforcement costs; the more fine-grained one's rules governing
use, the higher the cost to detect violations. Finally, it is far easier to ascertain
84. See also id. at 1765.
85. See, e.g., id at 1768; see also ReMine ex rel. Liley v. Dist. Court of Denver, 709 P.2d
1379, 1382 (Colo. 1985).
86. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1768; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110
YALE L.J. 1, 23-24 (2000) (exploring the numerus clausus principle and noting that it "presents
the picture of a fixed menu of options from which deviation will not be permitted").
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the remedy prescribed by a property rule than it is to value uses for
determining an appropriate level of damages.8
7
To summarize, in order to decide whether overall efficiency would be served
by a policy of intervening in cases of holdout, the costs in the following table
must be weighed:
COSTS OF MAINTAINING COSTS OF USING GOVERNANCE
EXCLUSION REGIME REGIME
(that is, permitting holdout to (that is, of intervening in
take its course): holdout):
Efficiency losses (that is, failure to Efficiency losses (that is, failure to
dedicate resources to highest value dedicate resources to highest value
use) caused by: use) caused by:
1. Strategic holdout (where it 1. Failure of liability rules to
prevents efficient transfer account for idiosyncratic
from occurring); and value;
2. Entrepreneurial holdout 2. Consequential losses, including
(where it is based on the undermining of
overestimation of resource's expectations of stability in
future value), possession; and
3. Tendency of liability rules to
facilitate opportunism based
on manipulation/deterioration
of use value proxies.
Increased administrative costs:
1. Increased assessment and
allocation costs due to need
for collective decision-making;
2. Increased rulemaking costs due
to signal deterioration and
manipulation;
3. Increased promulgation,
compliance, and enforcement
costs due to broad application
of fine-grained use rules; and
4. Increased self-help expenditures.
Tbl. A
87. On the other hand, the costs of actually enforcing an injunction may outweigh those of
enforcing a damages award, as the former requires officials to bring about specific actions
pertaining to unique objects, while the latter may be levied against any available property
belonging to the defendant.
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This comparison suggests that the goal of efficiency justifies protection of
possessory interests in tangible resources with property rules, rather than
liability rules--or in other words, the tendency of our legal system to allow
strategic holdout to run its course. Indeed, to the extent that the subjective
theory of value is maintained, it is questionable whether empirical observation
can ever provide grounds for overriding an instance of holdout in the name of
efficiency, given that the owner's refusal to sell renders his use the highest-
valued use by definition.
2. Reasons for Encouraging Ex Ante Avoidance of Possessory Holdout
By refusing to intervene in holdout scenarios, we give would-be property
purchasers an incentive to avoid becoming caught in them. According to our
analysis, however, the only way that a would-be purchaser could create a
holdout situation is by generating a potential surplus. Is not there a cost in
discouraging people from doing this? In fact, it is not the cultivation of the
surplus that we want to discourage, but rather, the failure to secure needed
rights to resources before doing so. One might argue that just as owners of
resources have incommunicable entrepreneurial information, so do would-be
purchasers. Although we may think that owners are generally in the best
position to perform the function of assessment, we cannot seriously think that
this function should be exclusively exercised by owners. How many efficient
transactions would be missed if not for the entrepreneurial efforts of would-be
purchasers who see potential value missed by current owners? By taking
productive steps that bring the potential surplus closer to realization, the
would-be purchaser renders her entrepreneurial vision more concrete and thus
more easily appraised by third parties. Rather than making an allocation
decision based on the competing speculations of the owner and the purchaser,
the determination can now be based on a more concrete demonstration of the
productive uses of which the resource is capable.
This reasoning is flawed for a number of reasons. First, most of the
knowledge that would likely be generated by B's committing of productive
inputs toward the realization of her intended use is knowledge pertaining to
whether that use is feasible on a practical level. For example, building the
entire course of a railroad except the stretch that would traverse A's property
would effectively demonstrate that the railroad could be completed upon
obtaining the right to use A's property. Entrepreneurial assessment, however,
seeks to answer another question entirely. It is not whether the railroad can be
built, but whether the value generated by that railroad will be greater than the
value generated by A's real or intended use of the land. This question can
never be answered empirically because the two uses are mutuaily exclusive
and can never be compared in practice. One can try through various means-
such as research into the expected shape of consumer demand-to predict
which use would generate more value, but proceeding with construction will
not do much to enhance the accuracy of these prognostications. It will,
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however, commit scarce inputs to an enterprise that may or may not be the
most efficient use of the resource. If not, either the resource must be allocated
inefficiently or the inputs will be wasted. Collective decision-makers are
likely to give these tangible sunk costs greater weight than the owner's
subjective or entrepreneurial judgments.88  Whereas if A and B make the
allocation decision through ex ante negotiation before any other resources are
committed, while they may still err, there will be no risk of additional waste.
Another way of thinking about this is to apply the heuristic device of the
"single owner" sometimes used in law and economics as a way of identifying
the efficient result in a situation where cooperative action between multiple
parties is not possible. 89 To apply the rule, imagine that all of the resources
whose allocation is at issue are under the control of a single owner, and ask
what he would do. This approach cannot overcome the limits imposed by the
subjective theory of value on our ability to discern efficiency, because the
answer to the question of what the single owner would do depends entirely on
the state of knowledge and preferences of that owner. The single-owner rule
may, however, help distinguish actions that are valuable to the process of
resource allocation from those that are wasteful. Thus, if we assume that our
landowner and railroad entrepreneur are the same person, then no matter what
decision this person might ultimately make about which use of the land is more
valuable, something that she definitely would not do is lay all but the last mile
of track before making that decision.
B. Reasons for Not Attempting to Correct Distributive Injustice
If there are dangers in collectively evaluating and allocating the many
possible uses of a given resource, they would be compounded exponentially by
the difficulties that would be faced in attempting collectively to determine the
fair distribution of the gains from each transfer of that resource. Smith's
argument for the advantages of reducing information costs by means of rough
proxies applies to this problem as well. Just as the right to exclude functions
as a delegation to the property owner of all decisions concerning resource use,
it also functions as an assignment to the property owner of all changes in the
resource's exchange value occurring during the period of ownership. Just as
we know that an owner's decisions regarding resource allocation are not
necessarily efficient in all scenarios, we also know that the changes in a
88. See, e.g., Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 & n.* (N.Y. 1970) (denying
an injunction that would have shut down a cement plant while noting that the defendant's
investment in the plant was "in excess of $45,000,000").
89. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More
Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 556-57 (1993) (advocating the "single owner"
device as a useful framework for determining the most beneficial joint output).
90. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1753-54 (discussing the advantages of
low-cost proxy signals inherent in an exclusion strategy system).
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resource's value can never be attributed entirely to the owner's productive
inputs. In each case, however, there is reason to believe that the delegation is
likely to mimic the desirable result more often than not, and more importantly,
to do so often and well enough that the errors are less costly than the cost of
intervening to correct them. Second-guessing the distributive justice of each
transaction would require us to promulgate standards for determining the "just
price," and the signals used as proxies for productive input would be subject to
the same forms of deterioration and manipulation as proxies for use value.
Moreover, these interventions into the price system would severely disrupt its
allocative function of providing information to sellers and buyers about supply
and demand. 9' The efficiency costs are so high that only an extreme aversion
to any possibility of windfall profits could induce us to accept them.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSION STRATEGY
A. Eminent Domain
Our obeisance to the theory of subjective value has its limits. There comes a
point in practice when we simply do not believe that the failure of A and B to
strike a deal really demonstrates that A's subjective enjoyment of the resource
outweighs the value that would be generated by B's potential use. It may be
that we think B's potential use would create positive externalities whose value
cannot be captured by B and offered to A in exchange for the resource, so that
B's failure to offer a price A is willing to accept does not accurately reflect the
relative values of the two uses. More fundamentally, even if A is refusing a
price that accurately reflects the value of B's potential use, there is a point
beyond which society is simply unwilling to recognize A's subjective
enjoyment of a resource as having a value greater than the tangible benefits
expected from that use. In such cases, the risk of strategic holdout is perceived
as being far greater than that of ignoring or discounting A's idiosyncratic value
or entrepreneurial judgment.
Even granting that idiosyncratic losses may sometimes need to be
discounted in the face of an apparently great potential surplus, the other costs
on the right side of the ledger suggest that this should be done very sparingly.
The lower the bar is for making such forced transfers, the more expectations of
stable possession are undermined, and opportunism encouraged and rewarded.
This opportunism imposes costs both because of the efficiency losses that
result from undercompensation and because the availability to would-be
purchasers of liability-based relief from holdout encourages such purchasers to
create (or fail to take steps to avoid) the types of holdout situations in which
society has signaled a readiness to intervene.
91. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 526 (1945).
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These considerations suggest a rationale for why intervention is only
allowed in situations of possessory holdout by means of ex ante takings
proceedings (such as eminent domain proceedings), rather than by ex post
proceedings (such as suits for damages), and why the former is permitted to be
initiated only by the state and only for a public purpose. 9 2 The need to publicly
justify a taking before it occurs reduces consequential losses, because it
prevents owners from being surprised by the sudden loss of resources.
Although the state can certainly engage or collude in opportunism, its limited
resources and need for collective decision-making should at least render it less
enterprising in this regard than private actors. The public use requirement, to
the extent that it is effectively implemented, provides some assurance that the
projects for which owners' idiosyncratic valuations will be overridden are
projects that actually provide significant benefits to the majority. 93
The administrative costs point in the same direction. Whether takings
proceedings are ex ante or ex post, costs will be incurred for collective
decision-making with regard to assessment, allocation, and rulemaking. The
costs of making, promulgating, and enforcing rules goveming takings are
likely to be somewhat smaller, however, when the state is the only potential
taker than they would be if any private person may legitimately become one.
Finally, the scope of self-help expenditures is likely to be much more restricted
when owners do not fear that private parties may legally take their resources
without notice.
B. The Accession Rule
Just as rare situations in which the perceived disparity between tangible
efficiency gains and idiosyncratic value impel us to override the right to
exclude, so too do situations in which we perceive radical disparity between
the value of an improved resource and the owner's productive contribution to
that value. The law of accession addresses this situation: when one person
takes a resource owned by another and increases its value dramatically through
the application of productive effort (and perhaps the addition of other
resources), the law does not necessarily regard this added value as belonging to
the original owner.94 Where the resource has been so altered that it cannot be
separated from the value added by the improver, and the majority of its present
value is the result of the improver's efforts, equity will sometimes impose a
92. See, e.g., Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2092-93 (discussing the use of
property rules and the limited applicability of takings under legal supervision).
93. But see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding the
constitutionality of using eminent domain to transfer land from one private owner to another in
order to further economic development).
94. See Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311,313-314 (1871).
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liability rule by assigning ownership to the improver and giving the original
owner damages for the value of the property 
in its original state.
95
It is worth pausing to clarify the term "accession," which - can refer
doctrinally both to the rule whereby an improver gains title to a chattel and the
rule whereby a landowner obtains title to unauthorized improvements.96 In
other words, the concept "accession" refers to the general problem of assigning
title when preexisting property and labor belonging to different parties are
mixed-a problem that has been resolved differently in different contexts. For
purposes of the following discussion, the "accession rule" will refer to the
doctrine that good-faith but unauthorized improvers of any sort of property
who create value disproportionate to that of the property taken should, at least
under some circumstances, be awarded title to that newly created value. One
can regard this principle as a special instance of a more fundamental principle
of "accession"; namely, that title to newly created value should be allocated to
the owner of the resource most closely tied to that value.97 Thus, the owner of
the tree or cow is said to own the fruit or calf by accession, and the traditional
doctrine of land accession allocates to the landowner title to any fixtures.
98
The version of the "accession rule" discussed here reflects the understanding
that in some circumstances, the resource most closely tied to new value is the
95. See id. at 320 (refusing to allow plaintiff landowner to recover hoops created by a good-
faith improver from timber cut on plaintiffs land). Although this doctrine had traditionally been
conceived in terms of whether the original property still existed in specie, Justice Cooley
recognized that for purposes of equity, the key issue was the relative contributions of the
improver's labor and the original resource to the value of the new asset:
No test which satisfies the reason of the law can be applied in the adjustment of
questions of title to chattels by accession, unless it keeps in view the circumstance of
relative values. When we bear in mind the fact that what the law aims at is the
accomplishment of substantial equity, we shall readily perceive that the fact of the
value of the materials having been increased a hundred-fold, is of more importance in
the adjustment than any chemical change or mechanical transformation, which,
however radical, neither is expensive to the party making it, nor adds materially to the
value. There may be complete changes with so little improvement in value, that there
could be no hardship in giving the owner of the original materials the improved article;
but in the present case, where the defendant's labor-if he shall succeed in sustaining
his offer of testimony-will appear to have given the timber in its present condition
nearly all its value, all the grounds of equity exist which influence the courts in
recognizing a change of title under any circumstances.
Id. at 320-21 (articulating Justice Cooley's comparative value theory); see also Earl C. Arnold,
The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 103, 103-07 (1922) (discussing
the Wetherbee decision to award the defendant the improved property).
96. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 17 (9th ed. 2009) (defining accession).
97. See Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459,
463 (2009).
98. See id. at 464-67.
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investment of the improver rather than the tangible property that was used to
create the value.
99
When applied, the accession rule is a departure from the exclusion
strategy.100 Strict exclusion principles dictate that the owner of a resource is
entitled to deny all others access to it, and that the state will enforce this denial.
The actions of the improver in indissolubly mixing her own labor and
resources with the owner's property merely give rise to another case involving
the general holdout scenario, leaving B in a position where her ability to reap
the surplus created by her labor is held hostage to A's right to exclude.
Though this result offends our notion of distributive justice, Smith's analysis
of information costs suggests that exclusion is nevertheless the preferable
approach. 10' The administrative advantages are obvious. Under exclusion, a
court need only identify the original owner and enforce his right to the resource
(or whatever is left of it). The accession rule, on the other hand, is a
governance strategy forcing the court to evaluate the relative contributions of
the original resource and the improver's contributions to the present value of
the resulting asset in order to award ownership. It also requires the court to
determine a specific value for the lesser of these two contributions, so that the
party not obtaining title may obtain restitution. Finally, the accession rule
undermines stability of possession, because owners may lose control of
resources without their prior consent.
Despite all of these costs, however, the law persists in applying the
accession rule. As we have seen, it did so first in cases involving improved
chattels. °2 The courts that adopted the rule in those cases did so because theybelieved that in at least some circumstances, distributive justice required it.' 03
99. Merrill recognizes that Lockean labor theory can be seen as based on an accession
theory, though he later characterizes Locke as "unabashedly ground[ing] original ownership of
property in first possession ...." Id. at 465, 497. While elements of both theories are present, I
believe the former characterization to be the better reading of Locke's position given his
emphasis on the disproportionate extent to which the value of a resource to human beings arises
because of the labor invested in it.
100. In Merrill's framework, this conflict between "exclusion" and "accession" would be
described not as a conflict over whether to apply an accession rule, but as one over which
accession rule to apply-that is, a conflict over which resource should be regarded as having the
most prominent relationship to the new value: the tangible property taken without permission or
the productive investments of the improver.
101. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1742-43.
102. Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311,313 (1871).
103. Id. (finding that to award all of the value of the improved good to the original owner "is
so opposed to all legal idea of justice and right and to the rules which regulate the recovery of
damages generally, that if permitted by the law at all, it must stand out as an anomaly and must
rest upon peculiar reasons"); see also Arnold, supra note 95, at 106 (showing that even before
Cooley's articulation of the comparative value theory, courts recognized an exception to the
owner's claim in "'cases in which the accession of value to the raw material is so far beyond the
original value, as to impress on the reason of mankind, the injustice of permitting the bona fide
[Vol. 59:61
Patent Infringement as Nuisance
More recently, a version of the rule has come to be applied even in the area of
encroachments on land. The traditional American common-law rule was that
improvements to land, whether made in good or bad faith, simply belonged to
the owner of the land. °4 As for structures built across boundary lines, the
owner of the land encroached upon is generally entitled to a mandatory
injunction directing removal of a trespassing structure.10 5  This is the
paradigmatic application of the exclusion strategy; yet in practice it, too, is
subject to exception, albeit an ostensibly stringent one, as recently stated by the
Washington Court of Appeals in Proctor v. Huntington:
Generally, courts will order an encroacher to remove encroaching
structures even though it is extraordinary relief. But we have
recognized an exception where such an order would be oppressive.
To trigger the exception, the encroacher must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) he did not simply take a calculated risk
or act in bad faith, or act negligently, willfully, or indifferently in
locating the encroaching structure; (2) the damage to the landowner
is slight and the benefit of removal equally small; (3) there is ample
remaining room for a structure suitable for the area and there is no
real limitation on the property's future use; (4) it is impractical to
move the encroaching structure as built; and (5) there is an enormous
disparity in the resulting hardships.
0 6
The motive for creating this exception is somewhat different on its face from
the one expressed in Wetherbee v. Green.10 7 In chattel accession, the question
is who shall own the value created by the improver. In encroachment, it is
whether that value should be destroyed at the landowner's request. 1° 8 While
the latter concern is not, strictly speaking, distributive, both nevertheless flow
producer of that increased value, to be deprived of it' (quoting Lampton's Ex'rs v. Preston's
Ex'rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 454, 461 (1829)).
104. See Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REv. 37, 38-39
(1985); John Henry Merryman, Improving the Lot of the Trespassing Improver, 11 STAN. L. REV.
456, 465 (1959).
105. See L.C. Warden, Mandatory Injunction to Compel Removal of Encroachments by
Adjoining Landowner, 28 A.L.R. 2D 679, 686-91 (1953) (collecting cases).
106. Proctor v. Huntington, 192 P.3d 958, 964 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
107. Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 319-20.
108. Law and economics analysis would have us believe there is no real difference between
the two scenarios-Coase tells us that if the improvement is efficient and transaction costs are
low, the injunction will result not in actual destruction but in a transfer payment. Such reasoning,
however, is fundamentally at odds with the traditions governing equitable injunctions. These
extraordinary interventions are intended to prevent or rectify harms that no lucre can salve; to
seek one merely as a bargaining chip is to belie the necessary avowal that money damages are
inadequate. Thus, courts of equity tend to assume that an injunction will be enforced if granted,
and ask whether this result would be "oppressive," using some analysis similar to the one stated
by the court in Proctor.
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equally from our same principle of distributive justice-it is "oppressive" to
deprive someone of the value created by her productive investment without a
compelling reason.09
C. Keeping the Accession Rule Within Bounds
Because distributive justice and efficiency appear to be at odds in accession
cases, the question becomes one of identifying the circumstances in which we
can afford to purchase the former without incurring intolerable losses to the
latter. The test set out in Proctor does this through five enumerated
requirements, which we can parse as follows: number (1) guards against
strategic takings by encroachers, numbers (2) and (3) seek to avoid any likely
loss of idiosyncratic or entrepreneurial value by the owner, number (4) requires
that the encroacher's productive labor be indissolubly mixed with the taken
property, and number (5) requires a severely disproportionate hardship to the
encroacher before an injunction will be withheld.
1. The Problem of Good Faith
Much though we yearn to see distributive justice in individual cases, the
accession rule threatens to impose dynamic efficiency costs that are not to be
glossed over. An unfettered ability to appropriate by accession would permit
rampant opportunism, as takers set about helping themselves to resources by
making transformative use of them, again undercompensating owners,
radically undermining stability of possession, forcing courts to undertake
allocation, and giving rise to increased expenditures on self-help. This is why
the law of accession only permits good-faith improvers to lay claim to the
value of their improvements.' 10 Only where the violation of the owner's right
to exclude was unintentional can we afford to apply our sense of distributive
justice to the results of the error, because only by limiting the use of liability
rules to such cases do we restrain the threat of opportunism to acceptable
levels.
What do courts mean by good faith in accession cases? The Wetherbee case
provides an example. 111 Defendant Wetherbee claimed that, before cutting the
timber from which he made his hoops, he had obtained an abstract of the title
to the premises from a firm of land agents at the county seat and purchased a
109. Cf Arnold, supra note 95, at 106 (discussing the "injustice of permitting the bona fide
producer of... increased value, to be deprived of it").
110. See Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 313 ("Where vicious motive or reckless disregard of right
are not involved, to inflict upon a person who has taken the property of another ... is so opposed
to all legal idea of justice and right .... ); Arnold, supra note 95, at 108; Warden, supra note
105, at 705-09 (collecting cases illustrating the proposition that "[w]here an encroachment ... is
intentional or wilful, a mandatory injunction will ordinarily be granted to compel its removal,
without regard for the relative conveniences or hardships which may result").
111. See Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 311-12.
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license from Summer, one of the two parties identified as title owners of the
land.112 Summer told Wetherbee that he was authorized by the other owner to
make the sale, and Wetherbee cut the lumber in reliance on this statement. In
fact, however, Summer had already sold his interest to others, who then joined
with the co-owner to sue Wetherbee. 113 Justice Cooley ruled that if Wetherbee
could prove that his story was true, it would justify relieving him from the
burden of injunctive relief. 14 However, Justice Cooley did not explain why.
After all, Wetherbee could have avoided his predicament by tracking down the
second co-owner to ensure his consent.
Efforts to ascertain title are not costless, and they yield diminishing returns
of increased certainty. If the apparent likelihood that one's intended use will
violate property rights is represented by p, and the harm the intended use will
inflict on the owner bK H, then title search efforts costing more than pH look
likely to be wasteful. 15 Much as Judge Hand famously suggested that one
should not be held negligent when B > PL, 116 we might conclude that one
should not be held to have acted in bad faith when S > pH, where S is the cost
of the next untaken step to further ascertain title. Thus, when Wetherbee first
spied the trees, p was very high-he knew they must be owned by someone.
By the time he cut them, p was very low-amounting to the chance that
Summer was engaged in deliberate fraud. Given the fungible nature of the
commodity in question, it is reasonable to think that the added trouble of
tracking down the other owner outweighed the value of pH. As Stewart Sterk
has demonstrated, a rule granting injunctions every time an improver acts in
the face of uncertainty will tend to incentivize inefficient investment in search
costs, because the risk of holdout is likely to outweigh that of having to pay
damages for property wrongfully taken." 1
7
Here we must be cautious. For a court of equity to define the requirements
of good faith as a function of H would run afoul of Epstein's Law by assuming
112. See id. at 312.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 320.
115. This way of modeling the problem is inspired by Stewart E. Sterk, although he does not
purport to define good faith in this manner. Steward E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1285, 1302-05 (2008). In fact,
Sterk's analysis shows the range of inefficient searches to be much broader than those for which S
< pH, because one must consider not only the harm to the putative owner but the cost to the
would-be improver of abstaining from use (A). Only where this avoidance cost is less than H but
greater than pH would certainty as to property rights result in a decision by the improver to
abstain from an otherwise inefficient use of the property. See id. at 1306-08.
116. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947). But see
Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," 4 THEORETICAL
INQUIRES L. 145 (2003) (arguing that no one, even judges who espouse the Hand formula,
actually uses it to resolve negligence cases).
117. Sterk, supranote 115, at 1308-11.
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that both would-be improvers and courts can reasonably determine what value
the owner places on the property and calibrate search costs accordingly." 
8
Justice Cooley did not suggest that the value of the lumber had anything to do
with the level of diligence required of Wetherbee; he simply opined that
Wetherbee ought to be allowed a chance to prove his good faith, the
implication being that reliance on a license from Summer would qualify as
such proof. 19 Wetherbee did all that a reasonably diligent person should be
expected to-he consulted the applicable public title documents and contacted
an owner of record.
20
In the encroachment cases as well, good faith does not require that one
exhaust all available means for ascertaining boundaries. If one is on notice
that a potential boundary issue exists-as for example when one builds near
the confines of his own property, or when one has actual or record notice of the
existence of an easement-one must make a reasonably diligent effort to
respect the boundary.' 2 Seeking out and relying on information from a source
reasonably regarded as authoritative-a lawyer's opinion, title document, or
survey, for example-will tend to establish good faith if an error later becomes
apparent.12  Our goal here is to weed out deliberate takings without imposing
a standard so high that it leads to wasteful search costs or foregone
improvement.
While a determination whether the improver acted in good faith is not
costless or infallible, it serves as a manageable threshold requirement to the
application of liability rules, reducing greatly the number of instances in which
we will have to incur collective allocation costs. As Smith points out, the
118. Sterk's demonstration that liability rules lead to fewer inefficient searches than property
rules assumes that would-be improvers make decisions based on actual knowledge of H, an
assumption that Sterk acknowledges to be "often unrealistic." Id. at 1318. This does not
invalidate Sterk's conclusion that property rules are likely to lead to inefficient searches that
would not take place under a liability regime; it merely means that this fact alone does not call for
wholesale abandonment of property rules, as Sterk himself points out. See id. The cost of these
inefficient searches should properly be entered in the left hand column of our ledger above. See
discussion supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
119. See Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320-21.
120. Id. at312.
121. See, e.g., Griffin v. Red Run Lodge, Inc., 610 F.2d 1198, 1202 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting
that to establish innocent obstruction of an easement, a "defendant would have to show it
reasonably had no notice of the [plaintiffs'] rights, or that, with knowledge of those rights, it
made a good faith effort to locate an [improvement] ... but strayed ... because of a good faith
error by an independent surveyor as to the boundaries of the easement").
122. See, e.g., Stroup v. Codo, 212 N.E.2d 518, 520 (11. App. Ct. 1965) (defendant's
contractor made measurements from stakes at corners of lot shown on plat); Urban Site Venture II
L.P. v. Levering Assocs. L.P., 665 A.2d 1062, 1067 (Md. 1995) (defendant relied on survey that
contradicted earlier survey); Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 137 A.2d 667 (Md. 1958) (defendant
relied on surveyor); Proctor v. Huntington, 192 P.3d 958, 962 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (defendants
relied on surveyor's mistaken identification of boundary marker).
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governance rule applied by the accession doctrine is also relatively well-
contained in its information requirements. 23  When ruling on the law of
accession, a court makes a final determination as to ownership of the improved
asset and requires a one-time compensatory payment to the party who loses
it.124 These determinations require only a rough valuation of the improved
asset and a determination of whose input made the lesser contribution to its
value.'
1 25
2. Guarding Subjective Value
Epstein's Law tells us that a governance regime is likely to systematically
undervalue the harm to owners when resources are taken, largely because of
the difficulties involved in measuring idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial value.
It is noteworthy that in the case of chattel accession-the area where the
accession rule was first applied-this concern is absent. This is because the
fait accompli of the improver's transformative efforts has irrevocably assigned
a use to the resource, thus rendering moot whatever allocative preferences or
plans the owner might have had and leaving only the question of distribution.
In encroachment cases by contrast, it is generally possible to restore the land
to its former potentiality by removing the offending structure. The accession
doctrine must therefore include a description of the circumstances under which
courts can refuse to order such restoration without undue risk of destroying
idiosyncratic or entrepreneurial value. This explains such requirements as
those set forth as numbers (2) and (3) in Wetherbee-"(2) the damage to the
landowner is slight and the benefit of removal equally small" and "(3) there is
ample remaining room for a structure suitable for the area and there is no real
limitation on the property's future use."' 26 By requiring that these conditions
be met before the court will even consider the question of disproportionate
harm to the improver, we reduce the risk of triggering Epstein's Law to
tolerable levels.
V. AVOIDANCE COSTS IN NON-POSSESSORY USE CONFLICTS
It is sometimes possible to interfere with the use of a resource without
possessing or occupying it. This is the problem addressed by the law of
nuisance, which governs rival uses that elude the crude proxy of possession.
One way to characterize nuisance cases is that they involve a defendant who is
merely attempting to use and enjoy her own property, but the manner in which
123. See Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1770 (describing the "high degree of
modularity" promoted by the law of accession).
124. See id. (describing the court's function in accession).
125. See id. (noting that by "valuing the lesser contribution," the court is able to identify the
contribution more easily valued).
126. Proctor, 192 P.3d at 964.
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she does so interferes indirectly with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his.
Alternatively, one could describe the defendant as using the plaintiff's property
in a way that conflicts with the plaintiffs desired uses. These two
characterizations of the problem are economically equivalent, but appear very
different on an intuitive level: one is more likely to sympathize with the
defendant in the first situation than in the second.
The universe of non-possessory uses can be divided into two categories.
The first category contains activities in which the defendant is responsible for
the movement of some discrete identifiable physical object that invades the
resource in some way, even though the defendant does not physically possess
or occupy the resource herself. Examples would include bullets, rocks, or the
part of a building that overhangs adjacent property and invades its airspace.
Invasions of this kind are generally treated in the same way as possessory uses;
they are categorized as trespass and are subjected to a strict exclusion
standard. 127
The second category of non-possessory uses consists of activities that give
off no discrete, invading objects, but that nevertheless cause some physical
alteration to the qualities of the resource. Examples include smoke, vibration,
noise, and odor.128 Legally, these types of non-possessory uses fall into the
category of nuisance. 129 The Tennessee Supreme Court case of Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. provides a paradigmatic example of a
non-possessory use that was classified as a nuisance. 13  In Madison, the
owners of several small farms situated near two copper ore reduction plants
sued the plants' owners for nuisance based on the emission of large volumes of
smoke that were destructive both to the farmers' crops and to the health of
their families.' 31 The court chose to characterize the defendants' activities in
the first of the two ways described above, finding that they were conducting
their business in good faith and in a lawful manner without any desire to harm
the plaintiffs, and that they had made every effort to eliminate the offending
smoke.1 32 Noting that the copper plants had spent $200,000 experimenting to
this end, the court concluded that it was not possible to abate the nuisance
127. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 993-94 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules].
128. See id. at 999.
129. See id (highlighting courts' willingness to recognize the class of "tangible but non-
trespassory invasions" as fitting into the category of nuisance). Beyond this, one might define a
further category of nuisance cases involving harms that do not stem from any physical alteration
of the resource in question. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
130. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 659 (Tenn. 1904).
13 1. Id. at 659-60. The Madison nuisance falls into the second category of non-possessory
uses, because the defendant copper plant owners were responsible for the movement of something
that is not a discrete physical object (smoke) that nevertheless altered the qualities of plaintiff's
resources (their farms).
132. See id at 660.
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without ceasing the plants' operations and declined to issue an injunction. 33
Nevertheless, the second description was equally applicable: the defendants
were effectively using the plaintiffs' farms as receptacles of airborne waste.
Why do we differentiate between nuisance and trespass? Why not simply
use a strict exclusion strategy for both? Under such a rule, the plaintiffs in
Madison would be entitled to an injunction shutting down the copper plants. 134
Indeed, under a strict exclusion strategy, plaintiffs would be entitled to the
injunction as soon as the smoke caused any perceptible alteration to their
property-regardless of whether this damaged their crops, health, or anything
else-just as one is entitled to an injunction (and at least nominal damages)
when someone trespasses on his property, whether or not the trespass causes
damage. The concern raised by such a drastically enforced right to exclude is
that landowners would be vested with tremendous veto power over a wide
range of uses for any neighboring land. One may avoid trespassing merely by
refraining from the use of his neighbor's property; however, like the copper
plants in Madison, many beneficial uses of one's own property have
unavoidable (or avoidable only at enormous cost) spillover effects that vary
greatly in duration, magnitude, and effect. There is a far weaker correlation
between these spillover effects and actual interference with others' use of their
property than there is between trespass and such interference. As a result,
nuisance poses a less categorical threat to property owners' expectations of
stability in possession and use.
These considerations do not automatically defeat the case for applying strict
exclusion to both nuisance and trespass. Remember that the choice between an
exclusion strategy and a governance strategy is a choice between two different
sets of costs. 13 5 The cost of a crude exclusionary strategy is the inefficiency
caused when beneficial and non-conflicting uses are prevented by the
application of a strict exclusionary rule. On the other hand, the cost of a
governance strategy is the inefficiency caused when less valuable conflicting
uses displace more valuable ones, to which we must add the expenses of
collective allocation, the consequences of undermining property owners'
expectations of stable possession, and increased compliance costs. In the
context of nuisance, the costs of exclusion threaten to be substantial, while the
costs of governance will ultimately depend on the types of governance
strategies that are adopted.
133. See id. ("[l]f the injunctive relief sought be granted, the defendants will be compelled to
stop operations, and their property will become practically worthless .... ").
134. See id. at 660 (reasoning that the strict exclusion remedy of an injunction would force
defendants to close their plant, thereby destroying a valuable state industry).
135. See supra tbl.A (comparing the costs of maintaining exclusion and governance
strategies).
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A. The Significant-Harm Rule
While the methods for adjudicating nuisance disputes are various and
contested, there is consensus on the basic threshold for actionability: sanctions
will only be imposed on the defendant if the plaintiff demonstrates an actual
use conflict by showing significant harm.' 36 Only where such harm exists will
the court recognize a spillover effect as a nuisance. 137 Furthermore, because
the question of significant harm must be collectively answered, the court
necessarily employs an objective standard. 138  This requirement protects
beneficial uses that could be threatened by a rule giving people the absolute
right to enjoin the odors of their neighbors' cooking and the sound of their
dinner parties, but does so at the cost of sacrificing idiosyncratic values like the
ability to fast in peace. With respect to collective decision-making costs, the
significant-harm requirement is fairly easy to administer because it does not
call for precise valuations of conflicting uses, only identification of some effect
that would be considered a significant detriment under prevailing community
standards. 139  Although this standard will inevitably call for case-by-case
adjudication, it is fairly resistant to opportunistic manipulation by takers,
whose ability to precisely calibrate the magnitude of their spillover effects is
probably too limited to allow them to take systematic advantage of it. The
standard should also enable owners to form reasonably stable expectations as
to the kinds of harms from which they can expect protection.
While the significant-harm requirement thus seems like a reasonable step in
the direction of governance, it must be remembered that from a strict efficiency
perspective, there is no way to know. The only empirical way to compare the
owners' lost idiosyncratic value to that of the beneficial uses society has
collectively chosen to protect as non-conflicting (because they cause no
"significant harm") would be to enforce strict property rules and force people
to bargain over them. This method of measurement has a built-in margin of
error corresponding to the extent to which efficient transactions are torpedoed
by strategic holdouts-an occurrence that cannot be distinguished empirically
from efficient refusals to sell. The choice between the two approaches thus
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977) (stating that liability for
nuisance exists "only to those to whom it causes significant harm"); see also Madison, 83 S.W. at
662 (indicating that to succeed on a claim for nuisance, "the injury must be clearly established").
137. Think about what this means if analogized to the realm of possessory conflicts. It is as
though A, in order to prevent B from using his land or chattel (or to recover it from nonconsensual
occupation), were required to show that B was actually using the property in a way that caused
significant harm. It would not be enough for A merely to show that B was using A's land or
chattel without permission.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 F (stating that harm must be "of a kind
that would be suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition
and used for a normal purpose").
139. Id. § 821F cmt. c (explaining that the public nuisance standard of"[s]ignificant harm" is
met by showing "particular harm [that] must be significant in character").
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cannot be made on quantitative empirical grounds, but only by answering a
qualitative value question: which type of error disturbs us more? The
significant-harm rule demonstrates that society is more disturbed by holdout
than by the failure to protect idiosyncratic uses of property that do not conform
to prevailing community standards.
B. Exclusion Versus Governance in Identifying Nuisance
Having taken this step away from a pure exclusion regime, the question is
whether we need to take any more. Should a finding of significant harm be
sufficient to impose liability for nuisance? 40  The writers of the Second
Restatement of Torts think the answer is "no," and have offered a complex set
of factors to be weighed in deciding when a significant harm should be treated
as a nuisance. 14 1  The Restatement approach to nuisance reflects a strong
governance strategy, calling for courts to engage in detailed comparisons of the
costs and benefits of the two conflicting uses in light of various values.
Notably, the Restatement definition of nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land"142 leaves open
the possibility of nuisances that do not physically alter the plaintiffs property
in any way, such as aesthetic nuisances. Smith points out, however, that in
practice courts often adhere to something much closer to an exclusion strategy
than many theorists would like. 144 This trend is revealed in the persistence of
locational reasoning in nuisance decisions. Locational reasoning places great
weight on the determination of whether spillover effects are in some way
emanatingfrom defendant's land to cause physical injury to plaintiffs land. If
this is so, and if the harm is significant, then an exclusion strategy dictates that
the defendant be liable. Such locational reasoning is irrelevant to Coase, who
refuses to label the two conflicting uses as either "offender" or "victim," but
wants only to maximize their total value.' 45  Smith argues that this use of
locational reasoning in determining initial use entitlements is justified by the
140. Note that this is a question separate from whether liability should result in application of
a liability or a property rule.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822-831 (listing multiple factors to be
weighed when determining the gravity of a particular harm at issue). These factors include the
following: the utility of the use, whether one use outweighs the other, whether this comparison
renders the use unreasonable, whether the invasion of the other's interest is intentional, and
whether all these things put together result in an actionable nuisance. See id.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D.
143. Although "purely aesthetic nuisances" are rarely found to be actionable, some courts
have held to the contrary. See Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules, supra note 127, at 999-1000
n. 103 (providing examples of cases granting relief for aesthetic nuisances and recognizing that
modem commentators appear to be "favorable to the idea of aesthetic nuisance").
144. Id. at 998-99.
145. See id. at 998.
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same types of information costs that he discusses in connection with
146possessory uses.
To understand Smith's assertion, let us compare the information costs
involved in avoiding conflicting possessory uses with those involved in
avoiding conflicting non-possessory uses. It is relatively easy to predict in
advance the extent to which one will need to make possessory use of resources
controlled by others in order to bring a project to fruition, and to identify the
resources that one will need. For example, the hypothetical railroad investors
could not credibly claim that their need for A's parcel of land became evident
only after they laid all other segments of the track. It is even easier to identify
in advance those actions that will infringe upon the possessory rights of
others-there is no question that proceeding to lay the track without
permission would infringe A's rights.
On the other hand, under the Restatement approach to nuisance, while it will
often be possible to predict that certain activities are likely to cause spillover
effects, the question of whether these will rise to the level of actionable
nuisance depends on the relative values of the uses-present or subsequent-
of nearby land made by other persons. The existence of a conflict may not be
apparent at first; the nuisance may begin as an imperceptible encroachment and
only be perceived as an invasion after one of the conflicting uses reaches a
certain level of intensity, which may not be evident until after the defendant's
use has continued for some time and become economically entrenched.
Alternatively, there may not be a conflict until the affected land changes hands,
and the new owner makes different use of it. It is thus more difficult for a land
owner to avoid the risk that she will find herself embroiled in a nuisance
dispute after already committing resources to some productive activity. The
facts of Madison illustrate this problem. 147 In Madison, the court did not give
weight to the question of who came first, but it appears that a copper mine had
been in the area before the plaintiff-farm owners, although mining operations
had been temporarily terminated during the period when the farms were
acquired. 148 Once operations were resumed, it was many years before the farm
residents brought suit, and during that time, the copper plants had assumed a
fundamental economic role in the community-a fact that prompted the court
to deny injunctive relief.149
146. Id. at 1000-07.
147. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).
148. See id at 659.
149. Id. at 659-60 (noting that a period of ten years passed between the operation of the
plants and the time the suit was filed). Considering the delay in the plaintiffs' action, the court
found that the request for injunctive relief against one of the two defendants was barred by laches.
Id. at 664. Nevertheless, the court described the potential injunction as though it would stop
operation of both copper plants. Id. at 661.
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The locational approach to nuisance cases identified by Smith reduces-but
does not eliminate-the difficulty of complying with one's duty to avoid non-
possessory use conflicts 50 A landowner seeking to make use of her land still
cannot know for sure which spillover effects will interfere with her neighbors'
preferred land uses, but she can-at a minimum-narrow the list of activities
giving rise to potential liability to those likely to manifest themselves
physically on the property of others. Generally, only chronic generation of
some intense physical phenomenon (such as odor, smoke, vibration, or
temperature) will produce this type of effect on neighboring lands, which
makes risky activities easy to identify. 5 1 It therefore remains possible for a
landowner to foresee and manage the risk of liability associated with
productive investments by focusing solely on the nature of her own activities
and seeking to minimize her physical spillovers. Compared to the Restatement
nuisance doctrine, the locational approach greatly reduces the costs of
• - 152
allocation, compliance, and enforcement.
C. Accession of Non-possessory Uses: Epstein 's Rule
Even if the locational approach to identifying nuisance is adopted, the
question remains whether the right to be free of nuisances should be protected
by a liability or a property rule. In Madison, rather than grant an injunction
that would have shut down an economically significant industry, the court held
the plaintiffs were entitled to damages alone.' 5 In reaching its result, the court
did not deny that the injury to the farmers would qualify as "irreparable harm"
or consider the inadequacy of money damages to compensate people for the
loss of homes in which they had lived for over twenty years. Instead, the
Madison court based its decision on "a consideration of all of the special
circumstances of each case, and the situation and surroundings of the parties,
with a view to effect the ends of justice."'1 55 The combined value of the two
plants was nearly $2,000,000, and an injunction closing the plants would
render the property "practically worthless" and drive the copper plants from
150. See Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules, supra note 127, at 998-1005 (discussing the
locational approach to nuisance cases and the resulting reduction in the difficulty in identifying
and complying with one's duty to avoid use conflicts).
151. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing Smith's examples of physical
phenomena caused by nuisance).
152. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977) ("A private nuisance is a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."), with
Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules, supra note 127, at 998-1005 (outlining the locational
approach).
153. Madison, 83 S.W. at 666-67.
154. See id. at 660 (noting that the complainant had lived on and cultivated his farm for
twenty or more years).
155. Id. at664.
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the state. 56 On the other hand, the court noted that the plaintiffs' farms were
all on "thin mountain lands, of little agricultural value,"'' 57 and that the
aggregate value of the tracts was less than $1,000.158
The vast difference in the market values of the conflicting uses prompts
Epstein to approve the Madison court's holding, characterizing it as a case
where "even the most modest dollop of property protection could be regarded
as excessive."' 59 Why? Because "[i]t does not take a Ph.D. in economics to
see the holdout danger implicit in [such a] case."'160 Epstein states that "the
appropriate solution [to such cases] is to allow injunctive relief when the
relative balance of convenience is anything close to equal, but to deny it (in its
entirety if necessary) when the balance of convenience runs strongly in favor
of the defendant." 16  This rule of thumb-which this Article will refer to as
"Epstein's Rule"162-has a number of implications that require unpacking.
First, should the "relative balance of convenience"'163 be determined solely
by the relative market values of the two conflicting uses of plaintiffs' land? If
so, then both idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial value are thrown out the
window from the beginning. If the plaintiffs subjectively value their farms at
more than $2,000,000, or if they have in mind future uses of the land that will
be worth more than $2,000,000 (but that will be harmed or prevented by the
pollution), then applying Epstein's Rule leads to an inefficient result. Again,
there exist no empirical means by which to compare these efficiency losses to
those Epstein fears will result from strategic holdout.
Second, Epstein's Law tells us that seeking to avoid holdout by applying
liability rules will result in systematic undercompensation of plaintiffs and
inflict consequential damages. 64 If the owners of the Madison copper plants
had attempted to purchase the farmers' land before they began operating, and
the farmers had refused, presumably Epstein would object to allowing the
copper plants simply to take possession of the land subject to a liability rule,
even if the plant owners' intended use of the land was believed to have a much
higher market value than the farms. Why then is Epstein willing to allow the
plants to take the right to use the land physically (albeit non-possessorily)
156. Id at 660, 666-67.
157. Id. at659.
158. Id. at 666.
159. Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2102; see also Madison, 83 S.W. at 667
(awarding damages-instead of an injunction-to the plaintiff-farm owners in order to preserve
the valuable copper mines operated by defendants).
160. Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2102.
161. Id.
162. Epstein's Rule, of course, is not to be confused with Epstein's Law. See supra notes
57-58 and accompanying text (explaining Epstein's Law).
163. See Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2102.
164. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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through the backdoor means of making a significant amount of money by
doing so? Does not this form of taking open the door to rampant opportunism,
making Epstein's Rule run afoul of Epstein's Law?
Epstein's Rule looks a lot like another application of the accession
doctrine. 165 Again we have a defendant who has made rival use of someone
else's property to produce a significant surplus, and the question is whether she
or the original owner should be entitled to the value of that surplus. The
analogy is closer to encroachment than to chattel accession, because here too it
is possible to restore the taken property to its prior condition by discontinuing
the nuisance. As in encroachment cases, a court asked to enjoin a nuisance
whose value apparently outweighs that of the harm is being asked not merely
to redistribute value, but to destroy it. This makes accession look like an
attractive option. Instead of acquiring a right to continued possession of a
chattel or an improved piece of land, here the defendant would acquire through
accession a privilege of continuing to make non-possessory use of the
plaintiffs land. This solution is only desirable, however, if the inefficient
dynamic consequences of relaxing property rules can be kept to tolerable
levels.
1. The Good-Faith Requirement in Nuisance
This brings us to the question of good faith. We have seen that to avoid
encouraging opportunism, the possessory accession doctrine requires the
defendant to show that she reasonably believed she was not violating anyone's
property rights when she took and transformed the resource. 166 Such a belief
might come, for example, from a reasonable but mistaken perception as to
legal title or the locations of boundary lines.
In the context of nuisance, good faith might analogously be understood to
mean that when the defendant invested in the enterprise giving rise to the
nuisance, she had a reasonable but mistaken belief that there would be no
significant or harmful spillover effects. This was not the case in Madison,
however. The court did not rule that the defendants had believed there would
be no harm to plaintiffs. Instead, the court found that the defendants were
conducting their business in a lawful manner without any desire to harm the
plaintiffs, and that they had tried to eliminate the smoke, but could not do so
without permanently halting the plants' operations.1 67 Thus, the only form of
good faith required by Epstein's Rule is that the nuisance be an unavoidable
side effect of the surplus-producing activity. So long as the taker seeks to
minimize the spillover effects resulting from her own legitimate productive
activities, her foreknowledge of those effects will not put her in bad faith. This
165. See supra Part lV.B (discussing the law of accession).
166. See supra Part IV.B.
167. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 660 (Tenn. 1904).
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is a more lenient standard than that for possessory accession, where knowing
violation of the boundary line renders one ineligible for relief no matter how
great the disparity of hardship.
168
Epstein's Rule is also far less solicitous of idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial
value than is the encroachment doctrine. Recall that the rule in Proctor says
that no comparison of hardships will occur unless the damage to the landowner
is "slight" and "there is no real limitation on the property's future use."' 69 In
Madison, by contrast, the defendants won even though the plaintiffs' land had
been rendered virtually uninhabitable. 170 On both counts, then, Epstein's Rule
is a far less guarded departure from strict property rules than the doctrines
governing possessory accession.
2. Opportunism and Ex Ante Avoidance Costs
One way to justify Epstein's relaxation of property rule protection in
extreme cases of non-possessory holdout is to notice that in this realm, the risk
of opportunism by takers wielding liability rules is more evenly
counterbalanced by that of opportunism by owners wielding property rules. To
deliberately engineer a position of possessory holdout, A must accurately
predict B's future need for some unique physical resource that B has not yet
acquired. To engineer a position of non-possessory holdout, A need only
purchase land in the vicinity of some existing lucrative enterprise that creates
spillover effects. It is true, however, that B can seek to preempt such
opportunism by purchasing, or negotiating equitable covenants over, any
parcels foreseeably affected. Smith differs from Epstein by suggesting that the
law should incentivize B to do exactly that by refusing later to defuse holdout
with liability rules.' 71 Who is right?
The ability to accurately identify non-possessory use conflicts in advance is
subject to much greater uncertainty than is the ability to accurately identify the
future need for possessory use of resources. This uncertainty stems from two
unknowns: (1) the precise incidence and magnitude of future spillover effects,
and (2) the future uses of neighboring land. To this must be added a third
source of uncertainty: the unknowable outcome of any future nuisance dispute
should numbers (1) and (2) conflict. To decide what rights she needs to
purchase ex ante, someone wishing to make productive use of her land must
prognosticate on all three fronts. If her predictions on any one of the three are
168. See Warden, supra note 105, at 705-09 ("Where an encroachment by an adjoining
landowner is intentional or wilful, a mandatory injunction will ordinarily be granted to compel its
removal, without regard for the relative conveniences or hardships which may result from
ordering its removal.").
169. Proctor v. Huntington, 192 P.3d 958, 964 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
170. Madison, 83 S.W. at 666-67.
171. See Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules, supra note 127, at 1043 (advocating for a
technique that "refus[es] a blanket after-the-fact... liability rule approach").
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incorrect, much of the money spent purchasing rights (and the associated
transaction costs) will be wasted, either because she has purchased rights that
do not sufficiently protect her activities from holdout, or because she has
purchased rights that are unnecessary to her use of the land. The only certain
way to avoid nuisance ex ante is to avoid any activities likely to create
spillover effects, which would drastically reduce the number of productive uses
to which the land could be put.
It was argued above that in the case of possessory holdout, it is probably
wasteful to proceed making productive investments without first obtaining
rights to a needed resource, both because such investments do not generate
information about which use has higher value, and because the investments
themselves are wasted if the resource is ultimately allocated elsewhere.172 The
nuisance scenario looks rather different in this regard. First, proceeding to
engage in productive nuisance-creating activities does generate information
useful to gauging the relative value of those activities. Unlike possessory use
conflicts, non-possessory use conflicts are (at least in many cases) neither
immediately manifest nor absolutely exclusive, often permitting both uses to
proceed simultaneously for some time until the conflict manifests itself. Even
after that point, the two uses may proceed simultaneously for some time even
though one is being progressively harmed by the other. It is this fact that
makes possible the very comparison of market values on which Epstein's Rule
relies. In addition, in contrast to foreseeable possessory conflicts that can be
assumed to be absolutely exclusive, proceeding with a potentially nuisance-
creating activity may be the only way to ascertain whether-and to what
extent-it actually gives rise to significant use conflicts. As a result, when
gauging the information costs of failing to secure rights to non-possessory uses
ex ante, we must consider the possibility that they will be offset by information
useful to allocation that is generated by proceeding with the offending use. If
we apply the "single owner" test at a point before any final allocation decision,
we might conclude that in many cases such an owner would proceed in just
this way, experimenting simultaneously with potentially conflicting uses to
determine their relative values and practical compatibility. Holding people
strictly liable for their failure to avoid nuisance liability through ex ante
negotiation may not be worthwhile.
Despite the absence of a strict requirement that the taking of a non-
possessory use be unintentional, the scope for opportunistic taking of use rights
under Epstein's Rule may be narrower than it appears. In order to take
advantage of Epstein's Rule, a taker must make productive investments that
actually generate (as opposed to merely promising, as in possessory holdout) a
surplus vastly exceeding the value of the conflicting uses to which A is
devoting his land. If A is vigilant, he can probably stop B from reaching this
172. See supra Part III.A.
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point by suing as soon as the threshold of significant harm is reached.
Epstein's Rule can thus be construed as a form of laches: if you allow a non-
possessory use to continue until the demonstrable value of the defendant's uses
vastly outweighs that of your own, you lose protection of your idiosyncratic
and entrepreneurial value.'
73
Epstein explains that his rule is intended to prevent inefficiency that could
result from allowing "useful transactions [to] be blocked by a wide range of
strategic behavior[].' 74  As there is no way of knowing how much
idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial value are sacrificed, however, the claim that
this rule is more efficient cannot be substantiated by either empirical
measurement or economic reasoning. The rule may be more persuasively
explained as preventing distributive injustice that could result from allowing
neighbors to use their right to exclude as a sword to extract efficient holdout
premiums from the productive efforts of others. Limiting injunctions to
disputes where there is a relatively narrow gap in market value between the
two conflicting uses reduces the risk of failed negotiations, but it also reduces
the risk of successful ones in which holdout power leads to unjust transfers.
Either reading is consistent with the idea that the right to exclude should be
used only to shield from interference one's own present or future productive
uses of a resource. This norm is generally not enforced, because it is too
expensive to second-guess each instance in which the right is asserted. But the
nuisance cases subject to Epstein's Rule constitute a category in which the cost
of second-guessing is lowered by several factors: (1) the risk of opportunism
by takers is limited by the need to generate a large relative surplus before one's
nuisance gives rise to a dispute; (2) it is not clear that refraining from non-
possessory uses until one has negotiated rights for those uses is either feasible
or desirable; and (3) enforcing strict property rules would destroy value rather
than redistribute it.
VI. AVOIDANCE COSTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
How well do the arguments for exclusion in tangible property transfer to the
realm of intellectual property? Smith argues that "the problems of delineation
costs are not fundamentally different from those prevailing in property
generally."' 175  Smith's first example is a patent covering a mechanical
apparatus, which is a physical thing and thus has boundaries like any other
173. See, e.g., Iglesias v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237, 243 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The
equitable doctrine of laches allows a court to dismiss a claim 'where a party's delay in bringing
suit was (1) unreasonable, and (2) resulted in prejudice to the opposing party."' (quoting K-Mart
Corp. v. Oriental Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 911 (1st Cir. 1989))).
174. Epstein, A Clear View, supra note 18, at 2094.
175. Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1795.
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physical thing.176 From there the analysis progresses to patentable "things"
that are somewhat less concrete, such as chemical compounds, and then on to
industrialprocesses and business methods, which are not things at all but lists
of uses. Smith acknowledges, with regard to these latter types of patents,
that "there is an ever-present danger that claims will describe the goals of a
process while leaving too much vagueness in the description of the actual
process being claimed."'' 78  Smith labels this an issue of "substantive
breadth"--or the scope of the "thing" being treated as property-and contrasts
it with the issue of "functional breadth"--or the number of ways of interacting
with that "thing" that the owner is given the right to prohibit. Smith suggests
that while there may be a valid concern about substantive breadth with regard
to certain types of patents, the functional breadth of patent law is justified
because it reduces information costs in allocation and rulemaking, preventing
courts from evaluating uses or relative deservingness of owners and
infringers. 
179
Smith's discussion understates the extent to which an exclusion regime in
intellectual property not only differs from the underlying exclusion regime
used for tangible resources, but also directly conflicts with it. This is because
any system of IP rights amounts to a governance regime of use rights for
tangible resources--one that imposes all of the same costs identified by Smith
in his general analysis of governance regimes.1is In evaluating the choice
between exclusion and governance in the IP realm, we must consider the
possibility that accepting certain governance costs in the IP context may
ameliorate some of the disruption caused by intellectual property in the
tangible-property context.
A. Intellectual Property and Numerus Clausus
Consider Smith's simplest example: a patented mechanical apparatus.
18 1
Even though the patent claims describe a physical object--or to be more
precise, a class of physical objects having functions and characteristics that fall
within certain parameters-the right to exclude conferred by the patent does
not pertain to any such actual corresponding object. To avoid infringing a
patent, it is not sufficient to avoid appropriating or coming into contact with
any particular physical objects, whether possessed by the patent owner or
anyone else. This means that regardless of how "concrete" the conceptual
176. Id. (noting that in early U.S. patent law, patents were mainly granted to inventions
"embodied in some apparatus, a physical thing").
177. See id at 1795-96.
178. Id. at 1796.
179. Id. at 1796-97.
180. See, e.g., id. at 1785 (asserting that governance strategies isolate "uses and users in more
detail," and thus impose higher informational costs).
181. Seeid. at 1795.
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"boundaries" in the patent are, those boundaries do not (as they do for tangible
property) serve as crude proxies that obviate the need to identify and evaluate
potential uses of physical resources in order to comply with the property rights
of others. To the contrary, it is only through extremely detailed evaluation of
uses that anyone is able to determine whether or not actions transgress the
"boundaries" of the patent.182 This is as true of the patented machine as it is of
the business-method patent. In either case, the owner's patent rights reach into
the indefinite bundle of use privileges that are delegated to owners of tangible
assets under an exclusion regime, replacing some of them with duties not to
use one's own property in certain defined ways.
Indeed, when translated into their practical effects on the tangible property
rights of others, IP rights can be seen to constitute a radical departure from the
traditional principle of numerus clausus.183 IP rights amount to a form of a
negative easement-a restriction on the uses owners can make of their tangible
property. 184  They violate, however, several traditional limitations on such
servitudes. At common law, only a few specific types of activity could be
restricted by the use of a negative easement: conduct that blocked the flow of
light, air, or water in an artificial stream, or conduct that denied support to
buildings or structures. 85  These limitations protected a specific tract of
adjacent property, making negative easements appurtenant by their nature. 186
For the most part, the refusal of the common law to enforce negative
easements in gross against subsequent owners of land has survived to the
present day; while the Third Restatement of Property abandons this
182. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2008) (discussing the
difficulty of discerning patent boundaries).
183. For a discussion of the numerus clausus principle as applied to property law-that
similar to rights in civil law, "property rights must conform to certain standardized forms"-see
Merrill & Smith, supra note 86, at 4.
184. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN
LAND § 2:10 (2009) ("[A] negative easement enables the holder to prevent the owner of the
servient estate from doing things the owner would otherwise be entitled to do.").
185. See Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1267 (1982) (observing traditional types of negative easements
that were recognized at common law); see also United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446
(Va. 2005) ("The traditional negative easements recognized at common law were those created to
protect the flow of air, light, and artificial streams of water, and to ensure the subjacent and lateral
support of buildings or land.").
186. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 184, at § 2:10 ("A negative easement does not permit the
holder to enter or use the servient estate; it limits the right of the servient owner to utilize the
servient owner's own land. Historically a negative easement was considered appurtenant."); see
also Blaclonan, 613 S.E.2d at 446 (explaining that negative easements "are, by their nature,
easements appurtenant, as their intent is to benefit an adjoining or nearby parcel of land").
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restriction,1 87 the recent innovation of conservation easements generally
required specific legislation to make them enforceable.1 8 In practice, IP rights
are negative easements in gross that are not limited to real property and that
can be used to restrict an extremely broad range of uses. Once acquired, they
make servient estates of every chattel and every person within the territorial
reach of the law. These rights are freely transferable, and there are no
requirements that the person initially acquiring them stand in any sort of
privity to the tangible property burdened or that the interests protected in any
way "touch and concern" that property.
Smith and Merrill have argued that the numerus clausus principle is
important from an economic perspective because the proliferation of property
forms makes it costly for others to ascertain the legal dimensions of property
rights, which they must do in order to avoid violating the rights of others.
89
Smith and Merrill recognize that this principle is at its "weakest" in the area of
intellectual property, but they attribute this weakness solely to the common
law's occasional innovation in creating new doctrines, such as
misappropriation or right of publicity. 90 With regard to patent or copyright
law, Smith treats the statutory enumeration of limited lists of exclusive
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.6(2) (1998) ("The benefit
of a servitude may be granted to a person who is not a party to the transaction that creates the
servitude.").
188. See, e.g., Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 364 (Fed. Cl. 2006), aff'd, 250 Fed.
App'x 359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that forty-seven states have enacted legislation allowing for
conservation easements because "the equitable enforcement" of negative easements in gross was
prohibited). For a general description of the "uncertainty and difficulties" inherent in the creation
of enforceable conservation easements under traditional common law rules that negative
easements could not be transferred, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.6
cmt. a. As a result, there was "widespread enactment of statutes" to overcome the problematic
common law rules, and in 1981, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act was announced. Id;
see also id. § 2.6 cmt. a. ("Early law prohibited the creation of servitude benefits in gross and the
creation of servitude benefits in persons who were not immediate parties to the transaction.").
See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 855-57 (5th ed. 2002)
(outlining the history of restrictions on negative easements in England that were later adopted by
U.S. courts); 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.16 (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009) (1949) (detailing the evolution of juristic attitudes toward
transfer of easements in gross); John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool
for Land Preservation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319, 327 (1997) (noting that where the benefit of an
easement is held in gross, some courts do not allow the burden to run with the land).
189. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 86, at 23-24.
190. Id. at 19-20.
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rights19 1 as substantially satisfying the numerus clausus principle. 92  The
statutory admonition not to "make[], use[], offer[] to sell, or sell" a patented
invention would indeed be quite straightforward if that invention were a
tangible object with which one could simply avoid contact.1 93  In practice,
however, to determine whether one is making or using the invention claimed in
even a single patent may involve the parsing of scores-in some cases,
hundreds-of complex claims, and the total number of issued patents currently
in force is roughly 1.8 million.' 94 The type of search required to identify all
the use restrictions to which one's property is subjected by patent law is far
more costly and subject to error than a title search in a land register. 95
Further, an IP search is far more open-ended given that the search for patents
cannot be limited to rights affecting a specific piece of land or chattel.'
9
One might argue that the information costs involved in intellectual property
are lower, because the imposed duties apply to all personal property equally,
whereas the problem created by innovative forms of property entails drawing a
distinction between chattels that can be purchased in fee simple and those that
may be subject to some fanciful servitude.' 97 In addition, intellectual property
is of limited duration, whereas ordinary property rights continue in force until
they are terminated by someone having the power to do so. Although these
factors distinguish the information costs imposed by intellectual property from
those caused by proliferation in the forms of tangible property rights, they do
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting copyright holders exclusive rights to reproduce,
prepare derivative works based on, distribute copies of, and-with respect to some kinds of
work-to perform or display the copyrighted work); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (defining patent
infringement as "mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention" without
authorization).
192. Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1780; see also infra note 238 and
accompanying text.
193. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1795.
194. This rough calculation is based on information from the U.S. Patent Office concerning
the numbers of patents issued per year from 1991 to 2007. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart:
Calendar Years 1963-2007, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_
stat.htm. It assumes that maintenance fees on patents of various ages are paid the same
percentage of the time that they were in 1998. See also Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1504 (2001) (recording the "[p]ercentage of [p]atents
for [w]hich [m]aintenance [flees [w]ere [p]aid" in 1998).
195. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 182, at 51-68 (comparing the levels of difficulty for
running a land title search with that of running a patent search); cf Merrill & Smith, supra note
86, at 44-45 (arguing that notice of idiosyncratic property rights, even if given through a
centralized land register, is insufficient to restrict the information costs on third parties to
justifiable levels).
196. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 182, at 68-71 (discussing the "[platent [f]lood" and
observing that "firms are [often] sued over patents covering distant technologies").
197. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 86, at 27-33 (discussing problems that would be
inherent in the creation of a "fanciful" servitude-for example, by creating a time-share in a
watch).
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not support a conclusion that the former are less burdensome., Assuming
there is a recording requirement, purchasers of land and chattels could assure
themselves once-at the time of purchase-of the universe of idiosyncratic
limitations on their use and transfer rights because they would take title free of
any limitations not previously recorded. With intellectual property, on the
other hand, owners of tangible property must incur new search costs each time
they contemplate a new use, both because there are far too many use
restrictions in effect to process them all at once and because the scope of these
restrictions is in constant flux, given that old IP rights expire and new ones are
created without notice to the people whose property is affected.199
B. Undercompensation in the Acquisition of lP Rights
Once intellectual property is conceptualized as a governance regime
allocating use rights to tangible resources, the process of obtaining a patent can
be envisioned as a form of liability proceeding whereby the patentee pays a
collectively determined price in order to effect a (temporally limited) taking of
use privileges from the public at large. 00 Does Epstein's Law apply to this
liability regime? In patent law, the price paid by the patentee consists of the
disclosure of information.20 The patent applicant describes the scope of the
use privileges she wishes to appropriate, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office determines whether the information offered in exchange for
these privileges is sufficiently valuable to compensate the public for the
appropriation.20 2 The primary requirements that guide this determination are
novelty, 203 utility,204 enablement 2 5 and obviousness. 206 According to Smith's
analysis, undercompensation should be expected primarily in cases where
takers are better informed of potential uses than public decision-makers, but
198. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 182, at 68-71 (discussing the various information
costs caused by proliferation of IP rights in patent law).
199. See id.
200. Again, a patentee is appropriating use privileges from their prior owners. This vests in
her-the patentee-in the form of use rights-that is, the right to exclude others from these uses.
Although the patentee has taken away the others' privilege to use the patented invention, she is
left with only a right to exclude and may not have the privilege to use it herself.
201. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring that patent applicants provide specifications that
include "a written description of the invention" sufficient "to enable any person skilled in the art
... to make and use [it]," as well as a description of "the best mode contemplated by the inventor
of carrying out his invention").
202. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (describing the requirements for the specifications portion of the
patent application).
203. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (setting forth the novelty requirements).
204. 35 U.S.C. § 10 1 (providing that the invention must be "new and useful").
205. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (mandating that an inventor include specifications in enough detail to
enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to build the invention).
206. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (setting forth the requirements for non-obvious subject matter).
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less informed than current owners.207 Here, the current owner is the public at
large, so the adequacy of the compensation must be evaluated with respect to
various subclasses of the public, each of which will value the disclosed
information and claimed use privileges differently.
With regard to any given claimed invention, it is likely that most people
have little direct interest in either the use privileges at issue, or the information
disclosed. For these owners of use privileges, the question of whether they
have received adequate compensation collapses to the overall question of
whether the patent system is efficient as a whole-that is, whether the value
conferred on the public by inventions that would not have been disclosed in the
absence of patent protection outweighs the increase in prices that results from
restricting competition and the sheer cost of enforcing and complying with IP
laws.
For those members of the public who are actually interested in and capable
of exercising the use privileges at issue, the relevant question is whether the
information disclosed in the patent application significantly enhances their
ability to do so. We can posit one subclass of privilege owners who would not
have discovered the invention during the patent period if the patentee's
disclosure had not brought it to their attention. These owners receive adequate
compensation, because the practical value of use privileges taken from them by
the patentee would be zero if not for the disclosure of the information. Now
that they know of the invention, they can bargain for rights to use it during the
patent term, and will be able to do so freely after the patent term ends. We can
posit another subclass of owners, however, who did discover the invention on
their own.20 8  To these owners, the information contained in the patent
disclosure is probably worthless, while the use rights that they have lost are
209valuable, leading to systematic undercompensation. In between is a third
subclass of owners who would have discovered the invention on their own
within the patent period. For these owners, the relative value of the disclosed
information and the use privileges depends on how much research and
development effort they are saved by the former and the purpose to which they
intend to put the latter. It also crucially depends on the price and the extent to
which the use privileges, once ceded, will be made available to them. If these
owners' use privileges were protected by a property rule, they would agree to
207. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 18, at 1781-83 (explaining that a "taker will be
able to pick out a class of assets that has a higher mean value than the one that the courts have
identified, and courts cannot cost-effectively keep up").
208. An example of this type of owner is someone who discovered the invention
independently of-but subsequent to-the patentee and discovery, but did not put the invention to
public use more than a year before the filing of the patentee's application. See 35 U.S.C. §
102(a)-(b) (stating that such independent discovery and use would not invalidate that patent).
209. Such owners are also likely to place a high idiosyncratic value on the use rights lost, as
people often do with things that they feel they have created themselves.
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cede them only if guaranteed a license to use them for their intended purposes
at a price lower than the cost of developing the invention themselves. The
members of this group who ultimately obtain licenses on such terms thus
receive adequate compensation for their taken use privileges, while those who
do not-particularly those who are not granted any license at all-are
undercompensated.
Note that much of the undercompensation to these privilege holders can be
characterized as lost entrepreneurial value. At the time the taking is initiated-
that is, the filing of the patent application-the privilege holder who is already
working on the same or a similar invention has reason to believe that his use
privileges will have more value in the future-when he completes
development of the invention-than they do now. By filing a patent
application, the applicant forces the Patent Office to evaluate the quality of the
information she is presently offering, without the benefit of information that
would be generated by allowing the privilege holder to complete his
development process. In turn, the most important proxies used by the Patent
Office to determine the value of the applicant's disclosure-novelty,
enablement, and obviousness-are each matters about which the applicant is
likely to have better information than the Patent Office, even though she may
not have better information than the class of interested privilege owners who
are at risk of undercompensation. The Patent Act further increases the
likelihood of undercompensation by requiring that the obviousness of an
invention be evaluated "at the time the invention was made., 210 Given that the
only compensation offered by the patent applicant in exchange for her taking
consists of information, the value of that information should ideally be
determined at the time the exchange is made, as it may well have diminished
since it was first generated. In effect, this provision is similar to a
compensation statute allowing a taker to pay compensation in present-day
dollars, but calculated as though the dollars had the same value as at some
point in the past.
2 11
The taking of use privileges to owners' assets through patent applications is
not as radically disruptive to expectation stability as a regime allowing
possessory appropriation of those assets would be. It is still, however, very
disruptive to those privilege owners who have their own plans to exercise the
privileges at issue. To avoid this, they will engage in the only avenue of self-
help available to them: the filing of preemptive patent applications of their
own, both to prevent others from taking use privileges they wish to exercise
and to obtain retaliatory rights to other use privileges that can be used as
210. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
211. The rationale here may be valid: we want to afford inventors space within which to
prepare a patent application and not force them to keep the invention secret while doing so.
Nevertheless, the effect on the value of what is offered to the public in exchange for patent rights
is as described.
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leverage in cross-licensing negotiations. This dynamic leads to both an
increase in the number of takings initiated and a deterioration in the quality of
the information offered as compensation: both situations increase the cost of
collectively allocating use privileges.
C. The Accession Rule Applied to Patent Law
In his recent article applying his work on exclusion and governance to
intellectual property, Smith analogizes the acquisition of IP rights to the
doctrine of accession. 212 In his analogy, the resource appropriated by the
improver consists of "either information in the public domain or the option in
the public to invent and use what the inventor has invented. ,213 Having mixed
her labor (and other rival inputs) with this substratum, the inventor creates a
214useful work to which IP law then allows her to take title. The analogy is an
uneasy one. The key factor in the accession doctrine is that the property taken
has been indissolubly mixed with the improver's labor, so that it is impossible
to return it and put the owner back in his original position without destroying
the value created by the improver.2 15 The actions of an inventor, however, do
not consume information or public use privileges in this way; to the contrary, it
is only the extraordinary intervention of IP law that prevents the public from
being left in possession of its original privileges. Indeed, the act of creation
itself does not impinge on those privileges at all, any more than beautifying
one's house involves appropriation of the neighboring parcels whose value is
enhanced.
It is tempting to defend the accession analogy by reasoning that the
inventor's labor has become indissolubly mixed with the public's use
privileges, because those privileges are irrevocably enhanced in value by the
inventor's efforts. Here we must proceed with caution, however. If anything
enhances the public's use privileges, it is not the act of invention itself, but
rather the disclosure of information enabling others to make better use of them.
In chattel accession, the enhanced value of the taken property is afait accompli
prior to the payment of any compensation. In discussing intellectual property
however, Smith treats the disclosure of information to the public as the
compensation, not as the act giving rise to the accession problem in the first
place.216 This elision masks another option available to the inventor: she can
keep the information to herself, just as the homeowner can build her own wall
if she wishes to forestall the gratuitous aesthetic enrichment of neighbors. Like
212. See generally Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1766-77 (exploring
"[r]ights in [i]nformation [t]hrough the [liens of [a]ccession [f]aw").
213. Id. at 1771.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 318-20 (1871) (discussing the operation of
the law when property is improved and unable to be divided).
216. Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1771.
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the homeowner-and unlike the encroacher or polluting factory-the inventor
has no need to appropriate anyone else's use privileges (and violate their rights
to exclude) in order to enjoy the direct benefits of her labor in the form of
value-enhanced use privileges to her own tangible property. Any claim of
distributive injustice, then, must be based not on some deprivation suffered by
the inventor, but on a theory-for which there is no straightforward common
law basis-that the benefits conferred on others give her a right to
compensation. 217 When IP law gives the inventor a right to exclude, it does so
not to prevent an injustice but to offer a reward.
Despite his detailed discussion of the accession doctrine and its modular
qualities, Smith does not discuss whether this same doctrine could be used to
provide limits on the patent owner's right to exclude. 21 8 Although accession is
problematic as an analogy for the original acquisition of IP rights, it bears
obvious similarity to the problem of the infringing improver at issue in eBay.
In such cases, we have an improver who has created a surplus of value by
taking a patented invention and investing rival inputs of her own. 219 As with
nuisance, the analogy is imperfect, because nothing prevents the return of the
patent owner's property in its original form. To do so, the improver would
merely have to stop engaging in the uses of her tangible property that are
covered by the patent. Also like nuisance, termination of the infringing use
would destroy the value created by the improver.
Consider the example used by Lemley and Weiser of a complex product
220containing an infringing component. Say B designs and builds a computer
containing a single chip that is found to infringe A's patent. The first question
is whether, and to what extent, the chip is indissolubly mixed with B's
computer. There are two possibilities: either the computer's design is such that
a different, noninfringing chip would not allow it to function, or a different,
noninfringing chip could be used, but irreversible investments make it a
practical impossibility to substitute a different chip in enough time to realize
the surplus. Either way, if B is enjoined from making or selling her product as
it is, a significant amount of value will be destroyed and investment wasted.
To apply the accession rule we must judge the relative contributions of the
patented invention and the improver's rival inputs to the value of the overall
217. See Gordon, supra note 51.
218. See generally Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1766-77 (offering a
comparison of IP rights to the law of accession).
219. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390-91 (2006) (noting that the
petitioner, eBay, invested resources to operate a popular website that was accused of infringing a
patent held by another company).
220. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 10, at 797-98 ("As a striking example, literally
thousands of patents have been identified as essential to the proposed new standards for 3G
cellular telephone systems, and more than four hundred patents are necessary to produce a DVD."
(citations omitted)).
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product at issue. This is an extremely difficult problem, given that there are
probably many components that are each but-for causes of the product's ability
to function at all. If the problem is posed as one of taking the value of the
complete product and attempting to allocate it among the various components
according to how much of that value is contributed by each, then in many cases
it may simply be unsolvable. 221 Of course, the same is true even in the realm
of normal chattel accession. In Wetherbee, the court did not determine the
relative contribution of the appropriated timber to the barrel hoops by looking
at the hoops and attempting to gauge how much of their present utility derived
222from the material from which they were made. Instead, the value of the
timber in its original form was subtracted from the value of the finished hoops
and what was left was attributed to the improver's input.223 This can be done
in chattel accession cases because the appropriated chattel tends to be
something fungible for which there is a readily determined market price.
224
The problem in patent cases is that a patented invention is generally not a
fungible commodity, both because it must bear some novel characteristic in
order to be patented, and because it cannot be freely manufactured and
commonly sold. Moreover, unlike tangible resources that are generally sold in
toto by transferring possession (and all potential use rights), intellectual
225property is usually licensed on a use-by-use basis. The number of directly
comparable transactions in which the same patent was licensed for the same
(or even a very similar) use may therefore be too small-and the transactions
too idiosyncratic 26-to permit any meaningful conclusion as to the "market
value" of the use B is making of it. If this is the case, and the infringing
product's design is such that no substituted noninfringing component could
enable it to function, we have no reliable basis on which to evaluate the
relative contribution of the infringing component to the product's value. In
such cases, the manifest distributive injustice needed to invoke the accession
rule is necessarily absent, leaving exclusion as the presumptive default
response.
221. For example, a car is useless without wheels. But one could say the same thing about a
car without a gas tank or a car without spark plugs. How would one go about allocating the value
of the car according to the relative contributions made by these various components when each of
them is equally necessary?
222. Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311,312 (1871).
223. The same is true in nuisance cases, where the relevant question is not "how much of the
factory's value is due to the pollution of plaintiff's land," but rather "how does the value of the
factory compare to the value of plaintiff's land before it was polluted?"
224. See, e.g., Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 318, 320 (discussing the appropriated chattel in this
case, which was cut timber).
225. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding
that "copyright licenses are assumed to prohibit any use not authorized").
226. For example, the consideration may consist of not only money but also of the cross-
licensing of the licensee's own intellectual property.
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On the other hand, if a noninfringing chip would allow the product to
function, then there may be a wider market for chips featuring the
characteristics required by the product. As a result, it may be possible to
determine the going value of such a chip if one bargained for it before
becoming trapped in a holdout scenario. In other words, there may well be
cases in which the patented invention is a fungible commodity so far as the
improver is concerned, because she did not incorporate it in order to take
advantage of the qualities that render the chip unique. Even when a
noninfringing substitute does not exist, the patentee, in some instances, may
have licensed to similarly situated improvers frequently enough to permit a
meaningful determination of the going market price. In these cases, it would
be possible to make the rough determination of relative values that the
accession doctrine requires and to deny property rule protection where it
appears that the value of the chip is small compared to that of the overall
product. In other words, in contexts where it is possible to assign a non-
holdout value to a patented invention (just as one can assign a non-holdout
value to a parcel of land), it is possible to apply the accession rule.
Just because it is possible to apply the accession rule in certain patent cases
does not necessarily make it desirable. Before deciding to do so, one must ask
the same questions asked in other contexts: how much opportunism would the
rule facilitate, how much counterbalancing risk of opportunism is there on the
other side, how feasible and desirable is it to require takers to avoid
infringement ex ante, and what sort of good-faith requirement should be
imposed on takers to enable them to be eligible for application of the liability
rule?
1. Opportunism
Much as in the context of nuisance, the practical mechanism of the accession
rule imposes inherent and significant limits on the extent to which it can be
used by opportunistic takers. First, the accession rule can only be applied in
situations in which there is a readily determined market price for the use in
227question. This means that when the patentee chooses to protect her
entrepreneurial value in commercialization of the patent by licensing particular
uses either exclusively or not at all--or where the infringement occurs so early
that the patentee has not yet had time to make this decision-this will prevent
takers from appropriating those uses under cover of the liability rule. Second,
there is the indissolubility requirement of the accession doctrine, which is
embodied in the nuisance context by the good-faith requirement that one
227. It is necessary to discern a market price for the use at issue, otherwise the calculation of
damages would be impractical. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 95, at 112-13 (noting that in
applying the accession doctrine, damages are measured according to the "value of the article in its
improved state").
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minimize one's spillover effects to the minimum level compatible with
creation of the surplus. In the patent context, this means that if a workaround
is possible, the infringer can only avoid an injunction for as long as is required
to implement one. Finally, the accession rule would only lead to the denial of
an injunction if the value added to the product by the improver is vastly greater
than that of the patented use. 228  Thus, people who merely copy or make
cosmetic changes to a patented invention will find no solace here.
Infringement is also similar to nuisance in that the potential opportunism of
takers is counterbalanced by the need to guard against opportunism by
patentees. As noted above, patent applicants are likely to have an information
advantage over the Patent Office, enabling them to take undervalued use
privileges from people who developed-or could have developed-the
information on their own. 229 Just as it is possible to purchase worthless land in
the path of a factory's emissions, it is possible to acquire patent rights
implicating the productive efforts of others based on a disclosure of
information that provides little or no benefit to anyone. Denying property rule
protection to patentees in cases exhibiting a high risk of strategic holdout can
be viewed as balancing out the earlier denial of property rule protection to
those privilege holders who would not have voluntarily relinquished their use
privileges in exchange for the benefit of the patentee's information.
2. Good Faith
What level of ex ante effort to avoid holdout should-be required of patent
infringers in order to be eligible for application of the accession rule? As
discussed above, when it comes to possessory use of tangible property, good
faith requires that the improver have an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that her actions do not transgress the boundaries of the owner's
property. Nuisance, on the other hand, requires only that the defendant's
taking of use rights have been incidental to a lawful productive enterprise and
that its magnitude be no greater than necessary for that purpose. 23  These
differing burdens correspond to differing avoidance costs and differing extents
to which proceeding with productive investment in the face of uncertain rights
may generate information relevant to use allocation.
This Article has already argued that the avoidance costs associated with
patent law are substantial. 23 1 Because one can infringe patent rights without
any deliberate copying, ex ante avoidance of infringement requires costly steps
228. In the context of the accession rule, courts will likely favor the improver when the
improved value is higher than that of the original article. See, e.g., Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320.
229. See supra Part VI.B.
230. See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 662 (Tenn.
1904) (determining that courts may give deference to the creator of the nuisance when the
nuisance is a legal trade operating in good faith).
231. See supra Part VI-VI.A.
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of uncertain efficacy, such as engaging in patent searches, construing the
language of patent claims in light of one's contemplated activities, and
attempting to license, design around, or forego implicated uses. Even after
incurring these costs, significant room remains for reasonable disagreement as
to the scope of the claims in a particular patent and whether those claims read
on one's contemplated activities.232 This uncertainty will be greater the further
the project is from fruition, because whether or not a contemplated use
ultimately infringes a patent claim will often depend on very specific details of
the manner in which it is implemented-details that cannot be predicted in the
abstract and whose legal significance is not always apparent on a facial reading
of the patent claims.233 Just as proceeding with productive investments in a
potential nuisance scenario generates information about the value of the
offending use and the actual extent to which its spillover effects conflict with
others, doing so in the face of uncertainty as to the scope of patent rights
generates information relevant to the question of whether one's activities
actually infringe potentially applicable patent claims.
Another source of ex ante uncertainty is the question of whether a given
patent potentially covering one's contemplated activities is valid. This
situation is analogous to the uncertainty in nuisance cases as to whether a given
spillover effect will be held to constitute a nuisance. Patent applicants
inherently enjoy informational advantages over the Patent Office, and because
of this, many patents are issued whose validity cannot withstand the scrutiny
brought to bear by an interested party in litigation. 234 Indeed, studies show that
235
nearly half of all litigated patents are eventually ruled invalid. This means
232. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223, 240, 251-52 (2008)
(studying appealed cases where the trial court was found to have wrongly construed at least one
patent term, which occurs 38.8% of the time, and noting that this rate does not improve with the
level of patent experience of the trial court).
233. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-27
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that without any information about the accused products, the "record
lacks the complete context for accurate claim construction"); Cheryl Lee Johnson, The
Continuing Inability of Judges to Pass Their Markman Tests: Why the Broken System Leaves
Judges Behind, Confused and Demoralized, in MARKMAN HEARINGS AND CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION IN PATENT LITIGATION 2008, at 65, 71 (Thomas L. Creel 2008) (discussing the
chronic inability of judges to consistently "construe highly abstruse patent claims cloaked with
technical jargon," despite their presumed exegetical skills).
234. See supra Part VI.B; see also, e.g., Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that Agrizap's patent for a device to kill rodents was invalid
due to obviousness).
235. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205 (1998) (finding that from 1989 to 1996, forty-six percent
of"final validity decisions by either district courts or the Federal Circuit reported in the U.S.P.Q."
found the patent at issue to be invalid); see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 182, at 277
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that the mere fact that a patent was issued is a poor proxy for validity. The
only way for an improver to truly ascertain whether a conflicting patent is valid
is to invest several million dollars in litigation.2 36 The high cost of determining
whether a given patent is actually valid and infringed--coupled with the threat
of injunction if it is-causes improvers to pay significant sums of money to
license patents despite serious uncertainty as to whether they need them. 237
Application of the single-owner test suggests that it is wasteful to require
improvers to form strong beliefs about patent validity in order to satisfy the
good-faith requirement. Someone who owned both B's patent rights and A's
facilities for making and commercializing a particular improvement might
conceivably refrain from selling the improvement if she thought it would
inefficiently interfere with her primary plans for commercialization of the
patented invention. She would not, however, spend large sums trying to
ascertain whether the improvement really infringed the claims in her patent.
That information has no relevance for the determination of how resources
should be allocated.
Even assuming the patent owner's preferred plans for commercializing her
invention to have entrepreneurial value, the accession doctrine developed here
enables her to protect that value by refusing to grant any non-exclusive
licenses. As noted above, the absence of a transparent market for the patented
uses will preclude the evaluation of relative values needed to apply Epstein's
Rule. Accordingly, there is no need to guard against this type of inefficiency
by imposing an additional good-faith requirement on improvers. Where the
disparity in value between the infringed patent rights and the improvement is
ascertainably disproportionate, the improver should be treated like the creator
of a socially productive nuisance, and not be enjoined simply because the
likelihood of infringement was foreseeable.
3. Distinguishing Between Willfulness and Bad Faith
One cogent objection to this conclusion is that once the patentee has licensed
a use enough times to make courts comfortable in discerning an established
market value, this value will become a de facto compulsory license rate.
Takers can then force the patentee to accept this license rate, as long as they
plan to add enough input of their own to pass muster under the accession rule.
After this type of taking becomes widespread, the "established" market price
that served to justify it will become fossilized and will cease to be an accurate
(explaining that although the Patent Office provides a reexamination procedure, firms are often
hesitant to use it because it "places firms at a disadvantage if subsequent litigation occurs").
236. See also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 182, at 131-32 for a discussion of the costs of
litigation, showing that estimated legal costs of litigating patent suits through trial range from
$610,000 to $4.14 million, depending on the amount of damages at stake.
237. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2032-33 ("The average royalty rate granted in
all reasonable-royalty cases is 13.13% of the price of the infringing product.").
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reflection of the patented use's value.238  This is another example of how
governance regimes lead to deterioration in the quality of the proxies they use
to determine value. Luckily, patent law provides an intermediate mechanism
that addresses this problem, albeit imperfectly, without giving the patentee full
holdout power: the rule that damages may be trebled for willful
infringement.
239
The statute itself only gives courts the power to increase damages up to three
times. It does not specify the type of conduct that should trigger this
penalty. 24 Until recently, there was no duty to search the Patent Office before
making productive investments, but once one received actual notice that a
planned activity fell within an area protected by someone's patent, "an
affirmative duty to exercise due care to avoid infringement" 241 was triggered.
This affirmative duty required one to seek and find information (usually, but
not necessarily, in the form of legal advice) supporting a "good-faith belief that
[the patent] was invalid," unenforceable, or "not infringed, 242 otherwise the
infringement could be ruled willful.243 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit recently abandoned this rule, holding that infringement is
willful only if the infringer acted recklessly-in spite of "an objectively high
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent." 244 The
Federal Circuit further clarified that this "objectively high likelihood" must
have been "either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the
accused infringer."
245
By relieving improvers of the affirmative duty of due care, 246 the Federal
Circuit's new standard for willfulness reduces the burden of the avoidance
costs whose utility was called into question above. Nevertheless, in cases
where an objectively high likelihood exists that the improver's actions
constitute infringement, the willfulness doctrine provides a strong incentive to
negotiate with patent owners. This mechanism serves to protect the integrity
of the market signals used by the system to determine the value of patent
rights. When combined with the accession rule, the willfulness doctrine can
238. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1308-16 (1996) (discussing the market-
distorting effects of compulsory license rates in the context of "cover" songs).
239. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
240. Id. (noting only that damages should be "adequate to compensate for the infringement").
241. SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
242. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
243. The willfulness standard, in other words, was congruous to the standard for innocent
encroachment.
244. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
245. Id.
246. Id. ("Because we abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we also reemphasize that
there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.").
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also be viewed as limiting the size of holdout premiums to three times market
value. This salutary effect only works, however, if courts avoid the mistake of
assuming that a finding of willfulness for the purpose of assessing damages
gives the infringer "unclean hands" so as to preclude the equitable decision to
withhold an injunction in accordance with the accession rule.
For example, assume the hypothetical computer manufacturer is approached
by the owner of the chip patent shortly before product launch. Assume that
this is the first time the patent has come to the manufacturer's attention (though
not because of any deliberate delay by the patent owner) and that, following
investigation, the manufacturer finds no basis to doubt that the asserted patent
is valid, enforceable, and infringed by the component chip. It is too late,
however, for the manufacturer to work around the patent in this first product
cycle without incurring catastrophic losses. Suppose also that the patent has
previously been licensed for similar uses for a small fraction of the value of the
manufacturer's entire computer. If this dispute goes to trial, the manufacturer
will be a willful infringer and will pay treble damages. He thus has an
incentive to buy a license for up to three times the patent's normal market
value, plus the anticipated costs of litigation. If the accession rule is applied,
that is the most value that the patent owner can extract. If the same willfulness
standard used for punitive damages also determines eligibility for the accession
rule, however, the patent owner can extract the full holdout premium. This
violates our criterion of distributive justice and does so without promoting
efficiency, given that the manufacturer already has sufficient incentive to buy a
license. The purpose of imposing a good-faith requirement before allowing
takings by accession is to incentivize takers to use their best efforts to avoid
making productive investments that depend on unauthorized use of other
people's property. The only way for the manufacturer to avoid making such
investments is to incur ongoing costs of patent searches, claim construction
during the period of development, and preemptive licensing for anything
potentially relevant-an excessive burden never imposed by the willfulness
standard. Properly understood, the purpose of the willfulness doctrine is not to
incentivize ex ante avoidance of infringing investments, but to incentivize
settlement-rather than litigation-once infringement comes to light.
VIII. CONCLUSION
IP rights and property rights in tangible assets are analogous because each
consists of a bundle of use privileges protected by a right to exclude. In
tangible property, the use privileges all pertain-and are defined by
reference-to a single tangible resource. 247  In intellectual property, the
247. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (explaining that property law seeks to protect an object with a related "bundle of
rights").
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protected privileges are defined by reference to certain ends and means and
pertain equally to all tangible resources that can be employed to achieve the
former through the latter.
24 8
The concepts of rivalness and entrepreneurial value have no application to
intellectual property if rivalness requires physical interference: one's use of his
tangible property to build a patented machine need never physically conflict
with another's use of her tangible property to do the same. Physical preclusion
of alternative uses is not the only form of rivalness, however. Rivalness is a
spectrum. The factory's output of smoke does not preclude the farmer from
farming; it merely harms the value of his product. Some people have argued
for expansion of the tort of nuisance beyond physical interference to cover, for
example, diminutions in property value caused by aesthetic harm.249 The
problem with this suggestion is that once the tether of physical interference is
left behind, it is difficult to know where to draw the line. If a diminution in
value caused by aesthetic harm is actionable, why is a diminution caused by
competition not similarly actionable? If one's competing store reduces the
value of another's, is the former party liable for nuisance? The only way to
distinguish between such various acts affecting property value would be to
apply some complex set of governance standards, and Smith's analysis of
information costs gives us reason to be wary of doing so without a strong
reason to think that those costs do not outweigh the gains from a more detailed
regulation of uses.250
The decision to institute a system of IP rights is a decision to institute just
such a governance regime. IP law grants rights to exclude that do not protect a
choice between incompatible uses of tangible resources. Rather, the rights
protect the IP owner's ability to earn a return on the rival inputs invested in the
creation of valuable informational works. This latter goal is not foreign to the
realm of tangible property rights, which also serve in part to resolve a positive
externality problem by conferring a right to the fruits of productive
investment-this, after all, is the point of the "tragedy of the commons"
parable taught in every first year Property course. Protecting the fruits of
productive effort is also the point of Lockean labor theory, and this means
protecting the creator's ability to use her creation in such a way as to improve
the circumstances of her life. This principle applies to creation for purposes of
exchange as much as to creation for purposes of consumption, and so the
concept of rivalness properly applies to uses that destroy exchange value even
though they create no physical conflict.
248. See, e.g., In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that receiving a
patent gives the owner "a property interest-to exclude others from use of the property").
249. See John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 286-87 (2001)
(discussing the evolving academic and judicial views of aesthetics in nuisance case law).
250. Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 29, at 1786.
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There are essentially two approaches available to an IP owner hoping to earn
returns on her investment. The first approach is to use the right to exclude as a
shield, behind which she (or her exclusive licensees) is able to select and
implement a uniform entrepreneurial strategy for maximizing the commercial
value of the work. The shield permits the IP owner to earn whatever return the
market affords without being undermined by competition--economically rival
use of the work-from others who seek to commercialize the same work even
though they bore no costs of its creation. This can be analogized to a rival
possessory use of a tangible resource, because it is a strategy very likely to be
disrupted by competing uses of the same work in ways that would be very
difficult to remedy with damages. We can never reconstruct what the returns
on the owner's commercial strategy would have been, which means her
entrepreneurial value is lost.
The second approach is for the IP owner to let others undertake
commercialization on a nonexclusive basis, using the right to exclude as a
sword to appropriate (through either licensing or litigation) some portion of
whatever they earn.25 Note that there is nothing inherently blameworthy
about this second strategy-not all creators are situated to be good
commercializers. We want IP owners to capture the portion of the gains from
trade that is commensurate with the contribution their creations make to those
gains. The problem is how to prevent the sword from being used to extract
returns that go too far beyond the value of the work, cutting into the value
created by the productive investment of improvers. It is not sufficient here, as
it is in the case of land, merely to advise improvers to acquire needed rights
and investigate boundaries before making themselves vulnerable to holdout
through irreversible investments. The nature of intellectual property is such
that it is often irreducibly unclear what rights are needed until significant
resources have already been invested.
Nonexclusive uses of intellectual property can thus be analogized to non-
possessory uses of tangible resources. Before a productive enterprise is shut
down for making non-possessory use of someone's land, the landowner is
required to make a showing that the spillover is harming a rival use of
comparable value. The farmer cannot shut down the factory by arguing that he
might use his land to build a luxury resort worth millions of dollars. A non-
possessory use is only regarded as rival to an actual use. If we were to apply
this significant-harm rule in patent law as well, it would largely eliminate the
so-called "patent troll" problem, as non-practicing entities would be no more
entitled to an injunction than an owner of fallow farmland. A strict significant-
harm rule, however, would not merely dull the patent owner's sword; it would
sunder her shield as well. Here too, however, our rules for tangible property
251. See, e.g., SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (affirming the award of enhanced damages in a patent infringement action).
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require modification when imported to the realm of intellectual property. It is
far too easy for infringers to act before an IP owner's plans for exclusive
commercialization can be implemented and far too difficult for IP owners to
discover and preemptively forestall all potentially infringing investments. If
property-rule protection is denied to IP rights whose exclusive commercial
value is not yet realized, that value will be strangled in the cradle.
This Article does not purport to resolve the dilemma, except to suggest that
it is unlikely to be resolved satisfactorily through economic analysis alone.
The "traditional equitable principles" invoked by the Court in eBay have long
sought to identify those instances in which we can afford to remedy
distributive injustice without encouraging the kinds of opportunism that the
right to exclude serves to prevent. This Article has sought to show that this
problem is present in all areas of property law and to illuminate the importance
of avoidance costs to understanding the array of different responses employed
in differing contexts. In important respects, the problem of holdout in patent
law is better analogized to nuisance than to trespass, which means that a strict
exclusion regime is unlikely to be optimal. Before departing from such a
regime however, courts must question how confidently they can identify
ambuscading sword-wielders without running afoul of Epstein's Law. To the
extent that they cannot, the default rule remains what it has always been:
assume the owner of intellectual property to be shielding entrepreneurial value,
and assist her to do so.
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